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Abstract 4
Countries with greater inequality typically exhibit less support for redistribution and greater 5
acceptance of inequality (e.g., US versus Western Europe). If individual nations evolve along this 6
pattern, a vicious cycle could form with reduced social concern amplifying primal increases in 7
inequality. Exploring movements around these long-term levels, however, this study ￿nds mixed 8
evidence regarding the vicious cycle hypothesis. Larger compensation di⁄erentials are accepted 9
as inequality grows. Weighing against this, growth in inequality is met with greater support for 10
government-led redistribution. Inequality shocks can be reinforced in the labor market but do not 11
result in weaker political preferences for redistribution. 12
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1. Introduction 15
The substantial increase in wage and income inequality over the last three decades is a 16
central focus of recent economic research and policy discussion. Much of the earlier literature 17
focuses on accounting for why inequality is increasing. One line of work considers changes 18
in the relative supply and demand for skilled workers due to shifts in educational attain- 19
ment, the introduction of labor-saving production and computing technologies, and capital 20
deepening. Others researchers consider structural changes of the labor market itself, like 21
the decline of institutions and policies that have historically compressed the wage structure 22
(e.g., unions, minimum wages) and the proliferation of "superstar" labor markets where top 23
performers earn disproportionate sums to those just behind them. The potential erosion of 24
social preferences regarding compensation inequality and redistribution is also widely dis- 25
cussed. For the United States, particular emphasis is placed on the explosion in executive 26
pay and deepening within-establishment inequality.1
27
The empirical literature mostly considers these potential determinants in isolation. Yet, 28
an important theme of recent macroeconomic models is that the interactions among the 29
factors bear signi￿cant responsibility. Moreover, a greater potential for the entrenchment 30
or ampli￿cation of inequality exists in this general-equilibrium setting.2 Taking skill-biased 31
technical change as an example, its individual e⁄ect on inequality to raise the skilled-unskilled 32
wage di⁄erential will be checked in the long-run as ￿rms substitute towards cheaper factors of 33
production or as labor supplies and education investments endogenously adjust. If the bias 34
is su¢ cient, however, the technical change and its concomitant increase in inequality may 35
also prompt lasting changes in the structure of the labor market (e.g., deunionization, in- 36
creased segregation of skilled workers) that entrench or magnify its solitary e⁄ect. Of course, 37
1Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) and Heathcote et al. (2010) provide recent surveys of various inequality
determinants. The appendix provides extended references on these di⁄erent channels.
2Examples include Acemoglu et al. (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Benabou (2003), Guvenen et
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interactions can alternatively dampen inequality shocks. Understanding these dynamics is 38
important for identifying how economies respond to primal inequality shocks. 39
This potential for ampli￿cation is particularly strong for social preferences regarding 40
income equalization and social support. First, if changes in inequality directly in￿ uence 41
ideology, then social preferences are a propagation channel for any shock to the income dis- 42
tribution, regardless of the source. Second, of all the factors discussed, social attitudes are 43
the least governed (if at all) by market-like mechanisms that can retard excessive changes. 44
Third, social preferences can a⁄ect many forms of institutions and policies￿ from ￿rm em- 45
ployment structures to redistribution policies￿ resulting in higher ampli￿cation. 46
Given these conditions, the formation of a "vicious cycle" is possible￿ where an increase 47
in disparity weakens concern for wage equality or redistribution and thus propagates and am- 48
pli￿es the original shock. Under this scenario, growth in inequality creates larger di⁄erences 49
across groups in society. These greater gaps then directly reduce support among the wealthy 50
for redistribution, as the wealthy feel less likely to become themselves poor or feel that the 51
poor are less like them. Increased social strati￿cation in society may also amplify the shock 52
if preferences for redistribution decline as groups spend less time in direct contact with each 53
other. Indirect channels may further exist, as the rich increasingly segment themselves into 54
workplaces and schools that entrench these di⁄erences across groups. Thus, under a vicious 55
cycle, the initial weakened concern produces even greater future compensation di⁄erentials, 56
a further shrinking of the welfare state, and so on, which kicks the process o⁄ again. 57
Support for the vicious-cycle hypothesis can be taken from the cross-sectional distribu- 58
tions of countries (particularly long-term OECD members) and regions of the United States. 59
Nations with greater income inequality typically demonstrate less support for redistribution 60
and greater acceptance of wage inequality than their more-equal counterparts. While the 61
evolution of countries or regions along this pattern would be consistent with hypotheses of 62
reduced social concern, this response is not guaranteed as many primal factors determining 63Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 4
these long-term ideology positions (e.g., beliefs regarding social mobility) may be stable.3
64
In contrast to the vicious-cycle hypothesis, changes in social preferences may counteract 65
inequality increases. In the face of higher inequality, individuals may believe that greater 66
redistribution and sharing of resources is warranted for the current generation and to ensure 67
equal opportunities for future generations.4
68
Ultimately, this question is an empirical matter as powerful factors are operating in 69
potentially con￿ icting directions and have unknown relative strength. The empirical response 70
of social preferences to changes in inequality has not been quanti￿ed. This empirical analysis 71
is of critical importance for immediate policy discussions. It would also provide a better 72
foundation for developing macroeconomic models of inequality in society, the discernment 73
of optimal policies that balance trade-o⁄s between insurance and agent incentives, and the 74
appropriate depiction of ￿xed versus state-dependent preferences. 75
This paper investigates this question by focusing on short-term movements in inequality 76
and social attitudes around the long-term level of each country or U.S. region. A ￿xed-e⁄ect 77
estimation strategy removes permanent di⁄erences in inequality and redistribution philoso- 78
phies, as well as common time trends. The contribution of this study is to characterize 79
how the resulting longitudinal responses resemble and di⁄er from the cross-sectional pat- 80
tern. How responses di⁄er by income class and neighborhood racial heterogeneity is also 81
considered. A ￿rst set of international results are drawn from a panel of countries repeatedly 82
surveyed by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Sur- 83
vey (WVS). Complementary results and extensions are developed through regional variation 84
3The determinants of this cross-sectional pattern have been a frequent and lively political-economy topic
since at least de Tocqueville. Alesina et al. (2001) and Hornstein et al. (2005) o⁄er broad studies of why
the United States has both higher inequality and a smaller welfare state than Western Europe, including
appropriate references.
4Political-economy models di⁄er in their predictions of how responses to inequality changes vary by income
class. Piketty (1995) constructs a Rawlsian model where increases in the inequality of opportunity, holding
￿xed beliefs regarding the incentive costs of e⁄ort, promote greater support for redistribution independent of
current income. On the other hand, redistribution preferences diverge with rising inequality in the median-
voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richards 1981) as gaps to the median income widen.Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 5
in the United States captured by the General Social Survey (GSS). To establish causal- 85
ity, an instrument-variable speci￿cation that exploits exogenous changes in the real federal 86
minimum-wage rate interacted with predetermined regional characteristics is also employed. 87
This step is a very important contribution of the study given the substantial degree to which 88
inequality, policies, and preferences jointly in￿ uence each other. The U.S. regional analysis 89
also allows us to consider the implementation of policy outcomes connected to social pref- 90
erences (e.g., state tax code progressivity, welfare expenditures), contrast multiple forms of 91
inequality (e.g., wage, consumption), and consider how gaps can emerge between preferences 92
and policies through features like voter participation. 93
The results of this study show that the potential mechanisms of the vicious-cycle hy- 94
pothesis con￿ ict with other, thereby weakening its overall strength. On one hand, larger 95
compensation di⁄erentials are accepted as inequality grows. This growth in wage di⁄eren- 96
tials is of a smaller magnitude than the actual increase in inequality, but it is nonetheless 97
positive and substantial in size. On the other hand, growth in inequality is met with greater 98
concern over inequality, greater support for government-led redistribution to the poor, and 99
greater support for more-progressive taxation. This is particularly true for inequality in the 100
bottom half of the income distribution. While greater class con￿ ict is perceived along in- 101
come dimensions, the increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are 102
as strong as those of poorer individuals. 103
These patterns suggest that short-run inequality shocks can be reinforced in the labor 104
market, and that changes in compensation di⁄erentials due to changing factors of production 105
and economic conditions are only modestly retarded by social preferences. By contrast, in- 106
equality growth does not result in weaker political preferences for redistribution, suggesting 107
that the policy channel alone is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle that ampli￿es primal in- 108
equality changes. Indeed, for the U.S. regional analysis, the translation of preference changes 109
into local policy outcomes is also evident with respect to dimensions like state taxation pro- 110Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 6
gressivity and minimum wage mandates. These empirical patterns provide insights for how 111
to most accurately model economic dynamics. Preferences in labor markets and competi- 112
tion for scarce skills in￿ uence inequality in a di⁄erent format and degree than what occurs 113
in policy markets and their choices regarding basic social well-being. The former appears 114
substantially more state dependent in its nature and easily adjusts, while the latter is more 115
￿xed within societies (but can vary across societies) and retards changes. 116
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to distinguish preferences regarding 117
inequality from other factors that in￿ uence perceptions of distributive justice. Political 118
economists have long considered how beliefs regarding the determinants of success a⁄ect 119
attitudes towards redistribution. Individuals and societies who believe hard work and e⁄ort 120
are more important for outcomes than luck or ancestry often choose systems characterized 121
by higher inequality and lower redistribution.5 Past mobility experiences and future expec- 122
tations of social position are also signi￿cant for attitudes towards income equalization.6 If 123
the forces driving higher inequality also alter these underlying beliefs, then social preferences 124
for equality may weaken. The analysis presented below controls for changes in these social- 125
mobility beliefs to isolate the e⁄ect of inequality, and additional research needs to evaluate 126
whether other ampli￿cation mechanisms operate through these channels. 127
2. Preferences in International Surveys 128
2.1. ISSP and WVS Data Structure 129
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducts annual surveys in member 130
countries (38 nations in 1999) on rotating topics ranging from religion to environmental 131
5Alesina and Angeletos (2005) demonstrate how di⁄erences in these beliefs can create multiple equilibria
among otherwise similar economies, as rational agents select taxation and redistribution policies (and their
associated distortions) that ful￿ll their original expectations. Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a related
general-equilibrium model where di⁄erent beliefs regarding how just the world is create two distinct redis-
tribution states. Guvenen et al. (2011) consider the general equilibrium of human capital investments and
redistribution policies.
6For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Benabou and Ok (2001); Fong (2001, 2006); Piketty (1995).Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 7
protection. This study primarily considers questions that were included in the 1987, 1992, 132
and 1999 Social Inequality module. Responses to three complementary questions proxy social 133
preferences for government-led income redistribution￿ the ￿rst considering the responsibility 134
of the government in the transfer of income (Government Responsibility), the second focusing 135
on the progressive nature of taxation (Progressive Taxation), and the last focusing on the 136
acceptability of current income di⁄erences (Inequality Acceptance). Higher responses on 137
a ￿ve-point scale indicate greater support for government intervention, greater support for 138
more progressive taxation, and greater concern over income di⁄erences. 139
Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of 140
occupations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of 141
current pay scales. From these responses, a Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio 142
is developed as the log ratio of the wages ascribed for a "doctor in general practice" and an 143
"unskilled worker in a factory." A higher ratio indicates a wider wage distribution (i.e., a log 144
ratio of zero would indicate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount), 145
while a lower ratio indicates less support for compensation di⁄erentials. Perceptions of 146
respondents regarding the actual earnings of these occupations are also examined below. 147
Finally, two questions regarding con￿ icts between social groups are considered. The ￿rst, 148
focusing on con￿ icts between the poor and the rich (Poor-Rich Con￿ ict), is used to validate 149
respondents￿awareness of inequality, while a second question regarding con￿ ict between 150
young and old people is considered as a falsi￿cation exercise (Young-Old Con￿ ict). A higher 151
score on a four-point scale indicates a greater perception of con￿ ict. 152
As a complement to the ISSP, responses to a question included in the 1990, 1995, and 153
2000 rounds of the World Value Survey (WVS) are studied. For this question (WVS Income 154
Equalization) respondents are asked to rate their views regarding income equalization, with 155
a higher score on a ten-point scale expressing greater concern. Table 1 details the countries 156
included, sample sizes, and average responses to these questions for both surveys. 157Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 8
These surveys are paired with national income inequality estimates using log Gini series 158
constructed from the United Nations Development Programme￿ s World Income Inequality 159
Database (WIID), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), 160
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), and various national statistics agencies. With a few excep- 161
tions, these Gini estimates are estimated with national samples of disposable (after-transfers) 162
household income and lagged one year. The U.S.-based analysis later considers alternatives 163
like wage and consumption inequality that are not possible with international data.7
164
2.2. Empirical Estimation Strategy 165
Figure 1 illustrates the main ￿ndings of the study. Panel 1A plots the average response 166
by country to the Government Responsibility question in the 1992 ISSP survey against the 167
country￿ s log inequality level. The trend line indicates that greater inequality is associated 168
with weaker support for redistribution. Panel 1B plots the average proposed wage ratio for a 169
doctor vs. unskilled worker. Respondents in countries with greater inequality propose a wider 170
wage distribution, too. These cross-sectional patterns have been frequently documented, 171
and both patterns could be taken as evidence that a vicious cycle could emerge with growth 172
inequality prompting changes in preferences that further amplify the original increase. 173
The patterns evident in the cross-sections, however, do not necessarily dictate the move- 174
ment of countries over time. Panels 1C and 1D consider changes in preferences and inequal- 175
ity from 1992 to the 1999 ISSP survey. In Panel 1C, increased inequality is associated with 176
greater redistribution support, in contrast to Panel 1A. Societies experiencing increases in 177
inequality become more concerned about income di⁄erences and assign an increasing re- 178
sponsibility to the government for transferring income. Thus, within-country shifts in policy 179
preferences for redistribution do not mirror cross-country patterns, perhaps because other 180
7The unpublished appendix provides additional information about the datasets employed, the sample
construction steps performed, and the empirical estimations undertaken. This information is provided for
both the international and U.S. preference estimations. The appendix also documents many additional
references and literature notes that were removed from the ￿nal paper due to space constraints. This
appendix is available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/wkerr/.Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 9
factors that a⁄ect redistribution preferences are not being in￿ uenced (e.g., belief about de- 181
terminants of success). Yet, Panel 1D does show that respondents propose a wider wage 182
distribution after increases in inequality. The within-country and across-country patterns 183
are much more similar with respect to preferences regarding appropriate wage dispersion. 184
While important for framing the analysis, the visual correlations fail to control adequately 185
for factors in￿ uencing both inequality and social attitudes for redistribution. First, common 186
shifts in attitudes over time (e.g., a greater worldwide concern for inequality not necessarily 187
linked to changes in the inequalities of individual countries) can a⁄ect the results. A robust 188
analysis should also control for changes between surveys in national income and demogra- 189
phy (e.g., an aging population). Finally, and most importantly, social-mobility experiences 190
and beliefs regarding the sources of success are primary determinants of attitudes toward 191
redistribution. It is important to account for changes in these experiences and perceptions 192
to isolate the role of increasing inequality. 193
To characterize how inequality changes in￿ uence social preferences, the study estimates
a series of regressions with individual responses to the surveys as dependent variables. For
simplicity, only least-squares speci￿cations are discussed; ordered-logit speci￿cations that
allow for non-linearities in responses yield similar results. The primary estimation equation
takes the following form (person i, country c, year t):
RESPi;c;t = ￿c + ￿t + ￿ ln(GINIc;t￿1) + ￿Nc;t￿1 + ￿Xi;c;t + ￿i;c;t; (1)
where ￿c and ￿t are vectors of country and year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. The cross-sectional 194
e⁄ects ￿c control for the long-run positions of each country in terms of preferences and 195
inequality levels, while the year e⁄ects ￿t control for systematic changes between surveys in 196
inequality growth and survey responses. These panel variables focus identi￿cation on relative 197
changes in inequality and survey responses across countries in the sample. Regressions are 198
weighted to form nationally representative samples and to have each country-survey carry 199Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 10
the same signi￿cance. The results are robust to di⁄erent weighting strategies. Standard 200
errors are clustered by country. 201
The ￿ coe¢ cient is the focus. Survey responses are ordered so that a positive ￿ coef- 202
￿cient re￿ ects a more-concerned position: greater concern for inequality, more support for 203
government intervention, and so on. The exception is the Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker 204
Wage Ratio, where a positive ￿ coe¢ cient re￿ ects a wider proposed wage di⁄erential. 205
The Nc;t￿1 vector of covariates includes controls for macroeconomic conditions in each 206
country contemporaneous with the inequality measure. A log GDP per capita covariate 207
controls for national wealth at the time of the survey; two other covariates control for the 208
share of economic activity in the country-year coming from industry/manufacturing and from 209
services. These factors can in￿ uence preferences for redistribution independent of inequality, 210
and incorporating these macroeconomic controls better isolates inequality￿ s role. Finally, the 211
Xi;c;t vector of individual-level covariates includes personal demographics and responses to 212
social-mobility questions as controls. These controls are discussed further below. 213
2.3. International Preferences Results 214
Table 2 presents the international results, with each row representing a separate set of 215
regressions for the dependent variable indicated. To conserve space, only the observation 216
counts for the Government Responsibility regressions are listed. Observation counts for the 217
other ISSP estimations in Panels B-F are similar, with slight di⁄erences due to respondents 218
not answering all questions. The ￿rst column reports regressions that include only country 219
and year ￿xed e⁄ects and macroeconomic covariates. Variables are transformed to have a 220
zero mean and unit standard deviation to aid in interpretation. Thus, the 0.161 coe¢ cient on 221
the Gini estimate in the ￿rst regression for Government Responsibility indicates that a one 222
standard-deviation growth in inequality is partially correlated with a growth of about 16% 223
of one standard deviation in survey responses towards greater government-led redistribution. 224Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 11
This positive elasticity con￿rms the visual patterns in Panel 1C of Figure 1, and support 225
for a more-progressive tax structure is also evident in Panel B. Panel G also ￿nds a similar 226
call for greater income equalization in the WVS sample. These partial correlations are 227
statistically signi￿cant and of moderate economic magnitudes. Taking the United States 228
as a speci￿c example, the implied increase in redistribution preferences from a standard- 229
deviation inequality growth would close the gap to the average responses of other Anglo- 230
Saxon countries (e.g., Canada, Australia, and Great Britain), but would fall short of the 231
levels of continental Europe and especially transition economies. The short-run responses 232
thus re￿ ect modest movements around the long-term levels of the countries. Nevertheless, 233
their positive direction suggests an inequality shock alone is insu¢ cient to start a cycle of 234
deteriorating support for redistribution policies.8
235
Potential omitted variable biases are a clear concern for these ￿rst two outcomes. It 236
is possible that the inequality metric is simply correlated with unmodeled factors that are 237
truly responsible for the higher support for government-led redistribution. The next three 238
rows, however, provide reassurance that concern over inequality truly underlies the sup- 239
port for stronger government intervention. The increase in inequality is associated with 240
greater concern for income di⁄erences in Panel C and greater awareness of social con￿ ict 241
between poor and rich in Panel D. As a comparison, Panel E ￿nds inequality changes are 242
not correlated with changes in awareness of social con￿ ict between young and old people. 243
These outcomes are consistent with inequality growth raising concerns about disparities and 244
prompting greater support for government redistribution. 245
Panel F demonstrates, however, that respondents are more likely to propose a wider 246
wage distribution with higher inequality. A one standard-deviation growth in inequality is 247
associated with a 0.25 standard deviation increase in proposed wage di⁄erentials. An un- 248
8Levels regressions without country ￿xed e⁄ects also con￿rm the cross-section correlations evident in
Figure 1. Nations with greater inequality have a signi￿cantly reduced concern for income di⁄erences, weaker
support for government intervention, and lower desire for a progressive tax structure. While critical, panel
estimations of inequality dynamics are rarely employed (e.g., Alesina et al. 2004).Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 12
reported disaggregation of changes in the Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio 249
￿nds the expansion to be primarily occurring between doctors and skilled workers rather 250
than skilled workers and unskilled workers. A similar elasticity is evident for the proposed 251
wage di⁄erential between the chairman of a large, national company and an unskilled worker. 252
This growth in proposed wage di⁄erentials￿ based upon what respondents think occupations 253
should earn￿ indicates at least partial acceptance of inequality shifts due to changes in rel- 254
ative factor scarcities and associated rewards. The coe¢ cient of 0.25 is statistically di⁄erent 255
from zero, a level where no support for a wider distribution is evident, and from a value of 256
one, a level where a full endorsement of the inequality expansion is evident if the inequality 257
increase is due to growing earnings di⁄erentials. 258
The 0.25 coe¢ cient is measured using all changes in inequality, and this approach may 259
understate the elasticity due to earnings inequality itself. By mixing growth in inequality 260
due to labor market di⁄erentials with growth in inequality outside of the labor market, the 261
0.25 coe¢ cient may underestimate the extent to which preferences regarding compensation 262
di⁄erential expand to accommodate increases in earnings inequality. In addition to propos- 263
ing wages for occupations, the ISSP surveys ask respondents what they think occupations 264
actually earn. Fixed e⁄ect regressions of Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio on 265
the perceived wage ratio for doctors and unskilled workers yield elasticities of about 0.6. 266
That is, growth in perceived inequality is again associated with larger proposed distribu- 267
tions, but not as wide as the perceived increase itself. This 0.6 elasticity ￿nding, along with 268
the reported results using national inequality changes, leads to the conclusion that social 269
preferences over wage di⁄erentials expand to accommodate substantial portions, but not all, 270
of growth in earnings inequality. These patterns suggest that short-run inequality shocks 271
can be reinforced in the labor market, and that changes in compensation di⁄erentials due to 272
changing factors of production are only modestly retarded by social preferences. 273
The second column of Table 2 adds each nation￿ s log GDP per capita to capture move- 274Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 13
ments in the overall wealth of the country, as well as Demographic Controls and Economic 275
Mobility Controls. Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and in- 276
come dummies. Economic Mobility Controls incorporate respondents￿answers to other ISSP 277
questions that reveal beliefs and experiences regarding social mobility. ISSP regressions in- 278
clude two questions asking respondents to rate the importance of being from a wealthy family 279
or of knowing the right people for getting ahead. Respondents believing these important sig- 280
ni￿cantly favor more redistribution. Past mobility experiences use respondents￿ratings of 281
the status of their jobs compared to their fathers￿jobs; respondents believing their jobs are 282
better than their fathers￿are signi￿cantly less likely to support redistribution. 283
The magnitudes and signi￿cance of the ￿ coe¢ cients on the Gini estimates are robust 284
to including these Demographic and Economic Mobility Controls. Column 3 further shows 285
the results are robust to including Work Controls of dummies for self-employed, supervisor, 286
unemployed, and a union member. Coe¢ cient elasticities are very similar after including 287
these covariates, which are further discussed in the appendix. The coe¢ cients in the WVS 288
regressions continue to suggest a higher elasticity of about 0.35. The higher share of devel- 289
oping countries in the WVS sample likely plays a role in these larger partial correlations. 290
Also, the larger estimates may be the product of o⁄ering respondents ten choices rather than 291
￿ve, making it easier to capture shifts in attitude. The speci￿c wording of this question may 292
also contribute, as further discussed in the appendix. 293
Poorer and transitional countries tend to have higher support for redistribution than 294
their OECD counterparts with similar levels of inequality (Austen 1999, Suhrcke 2001). 295
Moreover, they demonstrate signi￿cant changes in attitudes and inequality levels that dwarf 296
the more-stable advanced nations. To ensure the sample composition is not driving the 297
results, Column 4 includes Year x OECD dummies. Likewise, the ￿fth column incorporates 298
Year x Transition Economy dummies. The point estimates typically decline when forcing 299
the variation to be within the subgroups, but the elasticities mostly remain economically 300Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 14
and statistically important. The appendix discusses additional robustness checks. 301
2.4. Discussion 302
A causal interpretation for these results is reasonable, although not assured. Two ba- 303
sic concerns are the endogenous relationship between inequality and preferences (i.e., that 304
preferences also in￿ uence the inequality levels) and omitted-variable biases. The direction 305
of the results suggests that the reverse-causality concern is weak. It is di¢ cult to argue 306
that changes in social preferences to favor more income equalization produced increases in 307
inequality, while it is very reasonable that increased inequality led to greater support for re- 308
distribution. Employing disposable-income inequalities rather than gross-income inequalities 309
may bias the coe¢ cient magnitudes slightly, but will not change the direction of the ￿ndings. 310
On a similar note, this study concludes that adjustments in preferences for compensation 311
di⁄erentials allow inequality to become entrenched in the labor market. While these results 312
have greater scope for reverse causality, the growing concern by respondents over income 313
inequality and the greater support for government-led interventions suggest that the wider 314
proposed wage di⁄erentials are primarily a reaction to the inequality changes, albeit one that 315
sustains the inequality increase. 316
It may be possible, however, to argue an omitted factor prompted both the increases in 317
inequality and the changes in social preferences. For example, an increased openness to trade 318
may have raised inequality and also increased desire for government income stabilization out 319
of fear of globalization (and unrelated to the change in inequality itself). As noted earlier, 320
the consistent results of higher inequality being associated with greater concern over income 321
disparities suggest, however, that the most plausible interpretation is the increased inequality 322
acted directly on social preferences. A more-rigorous instrument strategy employed with the 323
U.S. data will also support this interpretation. Unfortunately, the U.S. survey employed in 324
the next section does not contain wage di⁄erential questions like the ISSP. Thus, the U.S. 325Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 15
instruments are only able to assess causality for the general redistribution result.9
326
3. Preferences in U.S. Surveys 327
To complement the international ￿ndings, regional variation in inequality and support 328
for redistribution from the United States is explored next. This study is important for three 329
reasons. First, while national inequality would be the most-perceived dimension for smaller 330
countries such as Bulgaria or Ireland, regional di⁄erences may be more important for large 331
nations that display signi￿cant heterogeneity in economic activity. Moreover, a substantial 332
fraction of policy and budget decisions in the United States are made at the state or city 333
level, with o¢ cials accountable to their local constituents. Finally, but certainly not least 334
from a research perspective, the quality and quantity of U.S. data a⁄ord extensions and 335
instruments that are not possible in international studies. 336
3.1. GSS Data Structure 337
U.S. social preferences are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS 338
has been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging from 339
1400 to 3000 adults. The analysis considers four questions on the survey through 2000. The 340
￿rst question asks on a three-point scale whether the United States should be spending more 341
or less money on welfare (Welfare Spending); an identical question regarding spending for 342
the space exploration program (Space Exploration Program Spending) is also considered as 343
a falsi￿cation exercise. A third question (GSS Income Equalization) documents respondent 344
support on a seven-point scale for the federal government￿ s reduction of income di⁄erences 345
between the rich and the poor. Responses are again ordered so that higher values correspond 346
9Suggestive evidence from the international panel can be taken from an approach that instruments each
country￿ s inequality trends using the inequality trend of its closest neighbor. Second-stage elasticities for
Government Responsibility and Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio are 0.234 (0.100) and 0.198
(0.125), respectively, when using the framework in Column 1 of Table 2. The instrument, however, is weak
with a ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient of 0.615 (0.336) and an F-statistic of 3.2 (standard errors clustered by country).
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to higher support for the reduction of inequality. 347
The analysis also considers how changes in political-party a¢ liation correlate with chang- 348
ing inequality levels (Party Identi￿cation). Respondents are asked to state their party pref- 349
erence and the strength of this association on a seven-point scale, with one being strongly 350
Republican and seven being strongly Democrat. Of course, many other factors in￿ uence 351
party a¢ liation, and the platforms of parties demonstrate temporal and regional variation. 352
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to portray the Democratic Party over the last three decades as 353
supporting higher levels of redistribution from the U.S.￿wealthy classes to its poorer classes 354
than the Republican Party. Regressions with this question study whether higher inequality 355
is associated with changes in political a¢ liation, in addition to changes in support for welfare 356
programs. The appendix details the wording of these four questions. 357
The ￿nal requirements for the U.S. analyses are the important inequality metrics. The 358
richness of U.S. data o⁄ers additional ￿ exibility, and two metrics of overall inequality are 359
considered. Modeling inequality with regional log Gini estimates a⁄ords comparisons to the 360
earlier international work. The detailed data also allow consideration of inequality trends for 361
di⁄erent parts of the income distribution. Thus, overall inequality is additionally modeled 362
as the di⁄erential between the log 80th and 20th percentiles. After considering overall 363
inequality, the 80-20 di⁄erential is disaggregated into the changes in inequality in the upper 364
and lower halves of the distribution. Inequality estimates in this section are calculated over 365
disposable family income for the four primary Census regions (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, 366
South, and West) from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS). 367
Figure 2 plots the mean response to the GSS Welfare Spending question and the 80-20 368
income di⁄erential for each region by year. Two identi￿cation issues for the U.S. ￿ndings can 369
be discerned from this graph. First, di⁄erences in regional inequality trends exist (the solid 370
line). While the South begins with signi￿cantly higher inequality than the other regions 371
in the early 1970s, the strong growth in inequality in the Northeast and West results in 372Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 17
the three regions being approximately equal by the late 1990s. The Midwest, while also 373
experiencing an increase in inequality, remains signi￿cantly lower than the South throughout 374
the period. Unlike the international analysis, however, none of the regions experience a period 375
of substantial decline in inequality. Thus, inference is from stable or growing inequality. 376
Second, the dramatic swings in the mid-1970s and 1990s highlight that regional varia- 377
tion in welfare support can be second-order to large national shifts, likely due to political 378
swings. The signi￿cant decline in support in the mid-1970s is linked to the explosion in 379
welfare caseloads in the prior decade, while the large dip in the mid-1990s surrounds the 380
1994 Republican Revolution during Clinton￿ s ￿rst term. The close co-movement of regional 381
inequality and Welfare Spending preferences between these periods is quite striking. The 382
national trends in inequality and social preferences are absorbed by the year e⁄ects, while 383
systematic levels di⁄erences between regions are controlled for by geographic ￿xed e⁄ects. 384
Given the importance of these national elements, the regression coe¢ cients for the regional 385
variation may be smaller than those captured in the international estimations. 386
3.2. U.S. Preferences Results 387
Table 3A considers a set of speci￿cations similar to the international regressions studied in 388
Table 2; Table 3B replaces the log Gini inequality metrics with log 80-20 income di⁄erentials. 389
Standard errors are bootstrapped for the U.S. analysis. Column 1 of both speci￿cations 390
￿nds changes in regional inequality partially correlate with a statistically signi￿cant increase 391
in support for all three preferences when only year and region ￿xed e⁄ects are included. 392
As expected, the coe¢ cients are somewhat smaller than those found in the international 393
regressions, as the regional variation is weaker than national trends. As a falsi￿cation exercise 394
for Welfare Spending, if anything respondents urge a decline in Space Exploration Program 395
Spending when inequality increases, but this result is not precisely measured. 396
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coe¢ cients are robust to including the regional median income (akin to the national GDP 398
per capita) and Demographic Controls, Economic Mobility Controls, and Work Controls. 399
Unfortunately, incorporating many GSS social-mobility variables severely limits the sample 400
size, but one can control for whether the ￿nancial position of a respondent￿ s family has 401
improved, worsened, or stayed the same over the last few years. The GSS does, however, 402
collect race data. Non-white respondents are found in the fourth column to have signi￿cantly 403
higher support for redistribution, even after including the other controls. 404
The coe¢ cients for Welfare Spending and Party Identi￿cation remain of similar size and 405
signi￿cance with these controls, but those for Income Equalization diminish. In general, once 406
controlling for a basic set of covariates and perceptions of mobility levels, the U.S. analysis 407
does not ￿nd a strong link between inequality and this support for Income Equalization. 408
In many respects, this question amalgamates respondents￿views regarding pay scales in the 409
labor market and redistribution policy. As the international evidence shows these dimensions 410
can move in opposite directions, the limited overall response for Income Equalization is not 411
too surprising. The most robust support again goes to increases in redistribution policies.10
412
The appendix also reports several extensions to this work. Decomposing the 80-20 in- 413
equality into the 80-50 and 50-20 di⁄erentials emphasizes that inequality growth in the lower 414
half of the distribution (i.e., the poor being increasingly left behind) is most responsible for 415
the aggregate results identi￿ed for the United States. A second analysis ￿nds fairly limited 416
di⁄erences across the income distribution￿ while the overall levels of support are higher in 417
10These results are robust to a variety of speci￿cation checks. First, demographic surveys often ￿nd
respondents over-estimate their relative ￿nancial position. In addition to actual incomes, the GSS collects
respondents￿perceptions of their incomes compared to the national average. The results are robust to
using these perceptions rather than actual income levels. Second, the southern parts of the United States
experience distinct economic and political adjustments during this period compared to the rest of the country.
While this variation is useful, similar outcomes are found when excluding this region. Finally, a concern using
regional variation in the United States is that spatial sorting by individuals over locations could in￿ uence the
measured social preferences and inequality levels (e.g., migration of poor to an area that would raise income
inequality and increase support for redistribution). The individual covariates control for this phenomenon
with respect to observables (e.g., income levels, age), and the appendix provides additional tabulations from
the 2000 Census of Populations that suggest sorting of this form is not biasing the results.Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 19
poor households, concern over rising inequality grows in all income groups. On the other 418
hand, the increase in redistribution support associated with rising inequality is diminished in 419
racially heterogeneous neighborhoods (e.g., Luttmer 2001, Lind 2007). These results suggest 420
changes in support for government-led redistribution are fairly uniform across income groups. 421
This ￿nding is in agreement with Rawlsian models like Piketty (1995), where di⁄erent classes 422
have similar views on distributive equality holding ￿xed beliefs about incentive costs. On 423
the other hand, the standard median-voter model suggests increases in inequality lead to a 424
divergence in preferences for redistribution as gaps to the median income widen. Further 425
work is needed to understand the degree to which this ￿nding applies to the extreme tail of 426
the income distribution (e.g., Atkinson et al. 2011). 427
3.3. U.S. Minimum-Wage Instrument 428
U.S. regional estimations agree with the earlier international results: increases in inequal- 429
ity partially correlate with increases in desire for government-led redistribution. In addition 430
to ￿nding this e⁄ect on two levels, it was earlier noted that the direction of the results, 431
the lagging of inequality, and the signi￿cance of survey questions focused on inequality it- 432
self suggest a causal interpretation is reasonable, although still not assured. An instrument 433
designed for the U.S. regional variation further undergirds this claim. 434
In recent empirical studies, labor economists note the role of the minimum wage in rising 435
U.S. inequality, especially during the 1979-1989 period when the real (i.e., in￿ ation-adjusted) 436
value of the federal rate declined by 24%. While these substantial swings in mandated federal 437
rates can be taken as exogenous from the perspective of individual states or regions, they do 438
not provide the necessary regional variation by themselves. An appropriate instrument can 439
be designed, however, through the interaction of these national trends with predetermined 440
regional characteristics that govern how important minimum-wage mandates are for the local 441
economy. The year e⁄ects absorb the national dynamics of the changing federal rate, and the 442Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 20
pre-existing regional traits are controlled for by the geographic ￿xed e⁄ects. The identifying 443
assumption is that the residual region-year interactions can serve as an instrument for the 444
residual region-year inequality trends. 445
This study employs regional coverage ratios, de￿ned as the percent of the working pop-
ulation protected by the minimum-wage statutes, as the interaction terms. The inequality
instrument for region r and year t takes the form
INEQ ￿ IVr;t = ln(FED1970=FEDt) ￿ E1970COVr;t;
where E1970COVr;t is the expected coverage rate in region r for year t, estimated from the 446
1970 industrial composition of the working poor by region and changes in national coverage 447
rates by industry. The ￿rst term, ln(FED1970=FEDt), is the log ratio of the real federal 448
minimum-wage rate in 1970 to the rate in year t. It has an initial value of zero for 1970. In 449
years when the real federal rate is greater than the real federal rate for 1970, this component 450
of the instrument has a negative value, and vice versa. Some states have mandated minimum 451
wages that exceed the federal rate. These are not considered as the local legislation could 452
clearly be endogenous to the inequality levels and will instead be analyzed below. The 453
appendix provides an extensive discussion of the instrument design and descriptive statistics. 454
Figure 3 plots a graphical version of the ￿rst stage for each region. The lines for the 455
minimum-wage instrument (the solid line) and the inequality level (the line with circles) 456
are residuals after year and geographic ￿xed e⁄ects are removed. The expected ￿rst-stage 457
relationship is apparent within each region. Estimated at the regional level and using boot- 458
strapped standard errors, the ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient for regional Gini inequality is 1.50 (0.40), 459
with an F statistic of 11.7 and a partial R2 of 0.16. 460
Table 4 presents the detailed results of the instrumental-variable speci￿cations for the log 461
Gini metric, and the appendix tabulates very similar outcomes using the 80-20 di⁄erential. 462
As inequality is lagged one year in the estimations, the instrument is lagged as well. The 463Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 21
second-stage results con￿rm the least-square speci￿cations discussed earlier; a one standard- 464
deviation increase in inequality is now found to produce 20% of a standard-deviation shift 465
in support for government-led redistribution and political party identi￿cation. Substantially 466
weaker results are found on the other two variables. The instrument speci￿cations are robust 467
to using other forms of aggregate inequality (90-10 di⁄erentials, entropy) or focusing on the 468
lower half of the income distribution through 50-20 di⁄erentials. The small increase in 469
coe¢ cient magnitude from the least squares results is likely due to the instrument focusing 470
on inequality in the lower part of the income distribution. 471
3.4. Types of Inequality 472
There are many forms of inequality: hourly wage, annual wage, total income, wealth, 473
and consumption inequality, in addition to their subvariants (e.g., before and after tax, 474
individual versus household). These forms of inequality are related to each other, but they 475
are also distinct from conceptual and empirical perspectives. The international portion of 476
this study is limited to income inequality due to simple data constraints, while the U.S. 477
analysis can consider more options. The appendix provides a detailed discussion about 478
these various types of inequality and social preferences that includes conceptual/theoretical 479
perspectives, observations about how concerns over inequality are most often expressed in 480
the media, the manner in which policy interventions most often occur, and simple data 481
quality considerations. From a welfare perspective, long-term consumption inequality is 482
the most natural link. In terms of the formation of social preferences, the discussion mostly 483
emphasizes income inequality as being the clearest metric available, but there is ambiguity.11
484
Table 5 replicates the Column 2 regressions of Table 3B (i.e., estimations including median 485
income levels, Demographic Controls, and Economic Mobility Controls) and its instrumental- 486
variable equivalent across three levels of geographic aggregation and three income de￿nitions. 487
11Pope (2009) provides an even broader description of well-being in the United States that includes access
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The ￿rst three columns are for least-squares regressions, while the last three columns are for 488
instrumental-variable speci￿cations. The two regional speci￿cations are annual and derived 489
from the March CPS while the state speci￿cations are at the decade level and derived from the 490
Census. The least-squares permutations are well-behaved and generally indicate a moderate 491
decline in coe¢ cient size as speci￿cations move away from disposable family income towards 492
the hourly wage de￿nition. The declining coe¢ cient sizes with lower levels of geographic 493
aggregation mirror the earlier coe¢ cient reduction from the international regressions to the 494
four Census regions variation. In words, the trend suggests that the preferences of individuals 495
in Vermont regarding inequality depend as much on the level of inequality throughout the 496
New England region as within the local state. However, these two trends are weaker in the 497
instrumental-variable permutations. While larger standard errors are evident in some state- 498
level or hourly wage speci￿cations, the instrumental-variable results in general are robust 499
across these dimensions. This may indicate that the lower coe¢ cient estimates are due to 500
greater measurement error in the more disaggregated series. 501
The appendix describes how income inequality shows a tighter empirical link to social 502
preferences than consumption inequality derived from food expenditures reported in the 503
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (e.g., Attanasio and Pistaferri 2014). The limited panel 504
correlation of the two forms of inequality at the region-year level allows direct contrast, and 505
food consumption inequality only marginally increases the explanatory power. This study 506
is very cautious, however, about these results due to the uncertainty about how best to 507
measure consumption inequality and multiple data challenges discussed in the appendix. 508
3.5. U.S. Policy Outcomes 509
This study mostly focuses on inequality and social preferences given the many ways in 510
which these two forces can interact and the limited understanding of preferences to date. 511
Table 6 evaluates the degree to which these social preferences are further observed in policy 512Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 23
choices. This is best done in the regional context of the United States given the consistent 513
U.S. data over states and the ability to construct comparable measures. To some degree, this 514
exercise is important for simply showing that the responses have meaning and are not just 515
"cheap talk."12 But more important, they also begin to trace out how preferences translate 516
into policy responses and where di⁄erences might arise. 517
Table 6 demonstrates a simple longitudinal link for several forms of state-level policy 518
outcomes and regional inequality. Column headers indicate the outcome variable studied. 519
Panels A and B provide least squares results using the regional Gini and 80-20 income dif- 520
ferential metrics, respectively. Panels C and D provide comparable instrumental variables 521
speci￿cations. Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation to 522
aid interpretation. Estimations include state and year ￿xed e⁄ects, control for the contem- 523
poraneous log median income, report bootstrap standard errors, and have 1,152 observations 524
from the cross of the 48 continental states and 24 years from 1977-2000. 525
The ￿rst four columns consider state-level tax code features taken from the NBER 526
TAXSIM database. U.S. states di⁄er substantially in the extent to which they tax income 527
beyond the federal level and how progressive this taxation structure is. Columns 1-3 combine 528
state and federal tax obligations to capture total tax liability in the state, inclusive of o⁄sets 529
between state and federal obligations. These metrics include the total top marginal tax 530
rate and the di⁄erence between the top and average marginal rates. Column 4 alternatively 531
isolates the state￿ s top marginal tax rate, and a zero value is given for states without income 532
tax. There is reasonably strong evidence of a shift towards a more-progressive state-level 533
tax structure with higher inequality. Unreported estimations likewise ￿nd a very sharp link 534
between inequality increases and an indicator variable for the state imposing at least some 535
additional income tax above the federal level. 536
12To validate these surveys, Luttmer (2001) demonstrates that over 30% of the variation in state welfare-
bene￿t levels can be explained through an interaction of attitudes towards welfare with state demographic
compositions. He also considers how norms for redistribution modeled with the GSS mirror voting patterns
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The next two columns consider state minimum wages, which are explicitly excluded 537
from the instrumental-variables design that focused on the changing federal rate. Column 5 538
considers the state minimum wage, with the federal minimum wage being the ￿ oor for states 539
without higher minimum wages. Column 6 considers the gap between the state and federal 540
levels, with an increase of zero being assigned for states that do not have higher minimum 541
wages. The connection on this policy dimension is quite strong, and there is again a very 542
sharp link between inequality increases and an indicator variable for the state imposing at 543
least some additional minimum wage increment above the federal level. The instrumental 544
variable elasticities are especially strong given the local treatment on this margin. 545
Columns 7 and 8 consider total and direct public welfare expenditure per capita taken 546
from state budget reports. There is evidence of growing welfare expenditure with higher 547
inequality, although this link should be treated with caution since the link is substantially 548
weaker with a log transformation of per capita expenditures. Supplementary regressions also 549
￿nd rising bene￿ts per recipient in the Aid to Family with Dependent Children program with 550
rising inequality using the ￿ve-year intervals for which these data are available. 551
On the whole, these estimations suggest a substantial link between regional inequality 552
and policy choices. Re￿ ective of the lower connections of preferences to inequality at more- 553
disaggregated spatial scales, these relationships tend to weaken with narrower measures 554
of inequality.13 Panels E and F instead use the regional averages of the government-led 555
redistribution and income equalization preferences, respectively. The averages again link 556
to policies, with elasticities somewhat lower than those derived with inequality itself. This 557
may indicate a connection of inequality and policy outcomes outside of preferences. It is 558
also likely that greater measurement error in preferences averages is downward biasing the 559
elasticity. Either way, this connection of preferences to policy outcomes is helpful to observe. 560
13This connects to the more mixed results in earlier studies of increases in inequality to policy changes
related to redistribution, which often use more localized metrics. Recent examples include Boustan et al.
(2010), Cooper et al. (2011), Corbae et al. (2009), and Corcoran and Evans (2010). Extended references
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An important topic for future research should trace out how changes in social preferences 561
translate into policy outcomes. The ￿ndings of this paper suggest that social preferences 562
regarding inequality adjust to desire more redistribution while allowing greater labor market 563
inequality. Di⁄erent political systems￿ including such diverse issues as government struc- 564
ture, campaign ￿nancing laws, voter participation, etc.￿ will in￿ uence whether shifts in 565
preferences produce important policy changes or not. The importance of franchising groups 566
favoring higher redistribution and the disproportionate in￿ uence of elites and special interest 567
groups are often noted in particular. How political systems are structured will govern the 568
degree to which rising concerns for redistribution generate e⁄ective political support. 569
To illustrate, this study closes with one example using voter participation. The GSS re- 570
ports information about the voting behavior of respondents. Respondents di⁄er in political 571
engagement, with lower voter participation among lower-income groups well documented. A 572
simple comparison suggests that the average voter expresses about 3% less support for redis- 573
tribution compared to the average individual overall. Moreover, declining voter participation 574
since the 1960s may be dampening support. This can be most easily seen using the pivotal 575
gap between the median income and the mean income in the median-voter model. In the 576
1970s, this gap is $6,105 using the GSS income data. The gap between the median voter￿ s 577
income and the mean income is smaller, however, at $5,311 (13% reduction). This di⁄eren- 578
tial already suppresses support for redistribution in the 1970s, and it has since widened. In 579
the 1990s, the gap between the median and mean incomes is $13,624, but the gap to median 580
voter is $9,468 (31% reduction). This is one example of how future work needs to investigate 581
the degree to which preferences across society are realized in policy choices. 582
4. Conclusions 583
This study characterizes how changes in inequality a⁄ect social attitudes towards government- 584
led redistribution and compensation di⁄erentials. Market-based factors have substantially 585Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 26
increased inequality in the United States over the last three decades. If the inequality caused 586
by these mechanisms reduces social preferences regarding distributive equality, the inequality 587
can become ampli￿ed and entrenched. While international and U.S. regional cross-sections 588
often display a strong negative correlation between inequality and support for redistribution, 589
this study ￿nds countries and states do not evolve along this pattern in the short-run. 590
Controlling for initial positions and respondent views of social mobility, local changes in 591
inequality are positively and signi￿cantly correlated with changes in support for government- 592
led redistribution. While greater class con￿ ict is perceived along income dimensions, the 593
increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are as strong as those of 594
poorer individuals. To the extent the forces driving inequality also alter the underlying 595
beliefs (e.g., determinants of success, mobility experiences, incentive costs) most important 596
for determining the long-term trade-o⁄ between inequality and redistribution preferences, 597
then these forces may contribute to reduced concern over the disparity. But the results of 598
this study suggest that a short-term increase in inequality is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle 599
where support for redistribution declines, thereby promoting further increase in inequality. 600
On the other hand, signi￿cant growth in proposed wage di⁄erentials are evident in the 601
international analyses with higher inequality. While less than one-for-one, increases in in- 602
equality are associated with greater acceptance of wage disparities. This pattern suggests 603
that labor market changes may reinforce inequality growth. Establishing these empirical reg- 604
ularities is important given that theory provides ambiguous predictions and understanding 605
the relative strength of the underlying forces requires quanti￿cation. 606
Several important areas for future research exist beyond the policy and institutional 607
channels described earlier. Political economists have long studied reasons for the negative 608
cross-sectional relationship between inequality and support for redistribution; this study 609
explored localized movements around these long-run positions. Recent theoretical research 610
considers endogenous shifts in long-term positions; as more data become available, future 611Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compensation Differentials 27
research should empirically test these longer-term dynamics. Such shifts will clarify primal 612
factors behind cross-sectional di⁄erences, highlight whether the concerned responses noted 613
here are governed by important thresholds or critical-mass points, and identify mechanisms 614
beyond ideology that can contribute to the formation of vicious cycles. 615
It is also important to characterize the channels through which inequality and preferences 616
interact. For instance, increasing social strati￿cation may amplify or diminish the direct 617
e⁄ect of increasing inequality on social preferences. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) report 618
greater inequality is particularly correlated with reduced membership in church and service 619
groups, activities often associated with assisting the less fortunate. Watson (2009) links 620
inequality with greater income segregation in cities. This deterioration of civic bonds may 621
weaken support for redistribution. On the other hand, Luttmer (2001) argues free-rider 622
concerns likely reduce support for welfare policies, and perhaps these concerns are weakened 623
in more-segmented communities. It is also unclear how the non-pecuniary status desires 624
that can limit support for redistribution change in a more-strati￿ed society (e.g., Corneo 625
and Gruner 2000, 2002). A better understanding of how strati￿cation and other channels 626
facilitate the interaction of inequality and preferences is an important next step. 627
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Notes:  Panel 1A plots 1992 ISSP responses on the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences, with higher values 
indicating greater responsibility. Panel 1B plots the average proposed wage ratio for a doctor vs. unskilled worker. Countries with 
greater inequality express lower redistribution preferences and propose a wider wage distribution. Panels 1C and 1D consider 
1992-1999 changes. Increased inequality is associated with greater redistribution support and wider proposed wage ratios. Notes:  Figure plots the co-movement in U.S. regional inequality and average support for welfare spending among GSS 
respondents. The solid lines without circles are the average support on a three-point scale for greater welfare spending by 
respondents in the region, with higher values indicating greater support. The lines with circles are regional inequalities measured 
as the log 80-20 income differential from the March CPS. 
Fig. 2: U.S. Welfare Spending Preferences and Regional Inequality Notes:  Figure plots the first-stage relationship between the U.S. minimum-wage instrument and regional inequality.  The solid 
lines without circles are the residuals from regressing the minimum-wage instrument on region fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and the region’s log median income level. The lines with circles are the residuals for regional inequality similarly constructed. 
Fig. 3: First Stage for U.S. Minimum-Wage Instrument Total Sample Long-Term Non Long-Term
OECD OECD
Countries 19 11 8
Respondents 54,091 31,083 23,008
Government Responsibility 3.65 3.41 3.96
(1-5 Scale) (1.19) (1.20) (1.10)
Progressive Taxation 4.02 3.97 4.10
(1-5 Scale) (0.77) (0.73) (0.82)
Proposed Doctor-Unskilled 3.80 4.16 3.35
Wage Ratio (8.17) (8.17) (8.16)
Inequality Acceptance 4.05 3.88 4.28
(1-5 Scale) (0.99) (0.99) (0.95)
Poor-Rich Conflict 2.52 2.45 2.62
(1-4 Scale) (0.84) (0.77) (0.90)
Young-Old Conflict 2.21 2.22 2.19
(1-4 Scale) (0.80) (0.75) (0.86)
Log Gini Coefficient 3.37 3.35 3.40
(0.17) (0.13) (0.22)
Countries 37 15 22
Respondents 137,006 51,104 85,902
WVS Income Equalization 5.25 5.31 5.22
(1-10 Scale) (3.01) (2.73) (3.17)
Log Gini Coefficient 3.51 3.35 3.60
(0.30) (0.16) (0.32)
Table 1: ISSP and WVS Descriptive Statistics
A. ISSP Social Inequality Panel
B. WVS Social Inequality Panel
Notes: Table provides descriptive statistics on social preferences for income inequality and government 
redistribution taken from the ISSP and WVS surveys.  Survey responses are ordered such that higher 
values indicate more-concerned responses, excepting the proposed doctor-unskilled wage ratio.  Variable 
means are reported with standard deviations indicated in parentheses.  Sample sizes in some regressions 
are smaller than total respondents as some respondents skipped questions; surveys also varied on the 
demographic and mobility information collected.  ISSP Long-Term OECD Members include AUS, AUT, 
CAN, DEU, GBR, ITA, JAP, NOR, NZL, SWE, and USA.  ISSP Non-Long-Term OECD Members 
include BGR, CZE, HUN, PHL, POL, RUS, SVK, and SVN.  WVS Long-Term OECD Members 
include AUT, BEL, CAN, DEU, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JAP, NLD, NOR, SWE, and USA.  
WVS Non-Long-Term OECD Members include ARG, BGR, BLR, BRA, CHL, CHN, CZE, EST, HUN, 
IND, KOR, LTU, LVA, MEX, NGA, POL, ROM, RUS, SVK, SVN, TUR, and ZAF.Base Base Including Including Including
Regression Regression Worker OECD-Yr. Trans.-Yr.
Controls Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log National 0.161 0.153 0.158 0.129 0.093
Gini Coefficient (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.058)
Observations 54,054 45,918 45,918 45,918 45,918
Log National 0.238 0.234 0.235 0.188 0.187
Gini Coefficient (0.071) (0.077) (0.076) (0.072) (0.090)
Log National 0.160 0.142 0.148 0.084 0.072
Gini Coefficient (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.067)
Log National 0.148 0.161 0.162 0.138 0.159
Gini Coefficient (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.036) (0.042)
Log National -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.088 -0.016
Gini Coefficient (0.052) (0.048) (0.048) (0.075) (0.077)
Log National 0.256 0.238 0.239 0.302 0.241
Gini Coefficient (0.089) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.089)
Log National 0.358 0.374 0.371 0.341 0.266
Gini Coefficient (0.100) (0.106) (0.106) (0.116) (0.146)
Observations 137,006 118,499 118,499 118,499 118,499
D. Poor-Rich Conflict Responses
E. Young-Old Conflict Responses
F. Log Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Wage Ratio Responses
WVS Panel
G. WVS Income Equalization Responses
Notes: Regressions consider the relationship between national inequality and preferences for redistribution 
and compensation differentials taken from ISSP and WVS.  Survey responses are ordered such that higher 
values indicate more-concerned responses, excepting the proposed doctor-unskilled wage ratio.  Regressions 
include country and year fixed effects.  Regressions include country-year controls for log GDP per capita, 
share of workers in industry, and share of workers in services.  Demographic Controls include sex, marital 
status, age, education, and income dummies.  Economic Mobility Controls include respondents’ views on the 
determinants of success (e.g., knowledge, family connections) and comparisons of their jobs to their fathers’ 
jobs (ISSP).  Work Controls include self-employed, unemployed, supervisor, and union-member dummies.  
Inequality measures are lagged one period.  Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation.  Regressions are weighted for nationally representative samples and equal cross-national weight.  
Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.  Observation counts for Government Responsibility 
are representative for other ISSP variables.  
Table 2: ISSP and WVS Regressions with Aggregate Gini Inequality
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
ISSP Social Inequality Panel
A. Government Responsibility Responses
B. Progressive Taxation Responses
C. Inequality Acceptance ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.130 0.135 0.114 0.132
Gini Coefficient (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.031)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.086 0.040 0.059 0.023
Gini Coefficient (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.198 0.206 0.217 0.196
Gini Coefficient (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791
Log Regional -0.044 -0.047 -0.067 -0.047
Gini Coefficient (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: Regressions consider the relationship between regional inequality and preferences for redistribution 
taken from GSS.  Survey responses are ordered such that higher values indicate more-concerned responses.  
Regressions include the log median income for each region, region fixed effects, and year fixed effects.  
Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and income dummies.  Economic Mobility 
Controls include recent changes in family financial position.  Work Controls include self-employed, 
unemployed, and union-member dummies.  Racial Controls include non-white respondent dummy.  
Inequality measures are lagged one period.  Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation.  Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.  
Table 3A: GSS Regressions with Aggregate Gini Inequality
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.098 0.114 0.127 0.112
80/20 Differential (0.030) (0.026) (0.036) (0.030)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.099 0.040 0.051 0.026
80/20 Differential (0.024) (0.039) (0.035) (0.028)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.135 0.164 0.173 0.158
80/20 Differential (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.028)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791
Log Regional 0.002 -0.015 -0.021 -0.016
80/20 Differential (0.026) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: See Table 3A.
Table 3B: GSS Regressions with 80-20 Income Differential Inequality
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.222 0.225 0.220 0.218
Gini Coefficient (0.064) (0.066) (0.080) (0.073)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.122 0.079 0.095 0.063
Gini Coefficient (0.112) (0.089) (0.093) (0.124)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.220 0.247 0.204 0.239
Gini Coefficient (0.049) (0.061) (0.058) (0.054)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,971
Log Regional -0.058 -0.038 -0.036 -0.041
Gini Coefficient (0.067) (0.062) (0.077) (0.070)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: See Table 3A. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, the first-stage 
coefficient for regional Gini inequality is 1.50 (0.40), with an F statistic of 11.7 and a partial R² of 0.16.
Table 4: GSS Gini Regressions with Minimum-Wage Instrument
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesSource of Log 
80/20 Inequality Four Nine State Four Nine State
Metric Regions Regions Level Regions Regions Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Tax Family 0.114 0.061 0.081 0.206 0.194 0.151
Disposable Income (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.061) (0.056) (0.065)
Pre-Tax Family 0.105 0.068 0.041 0.209 0.215 0.207
Labor Earnings (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.057) (0.056) (0.089)
Total Population 0.030 0.056 0.067 0.593 0.227 0.157
Hourly Wage (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.216) (0.069) (0.074)
Post-Tax Family 0.040 0.027 0.068 0.070 0.042 0.125
Disposable Income (0.032) (0.030) (0.035) (0.074) (0.082) (0.211)
Pre-Tax Family 0.032 0.023 0.020 0.098 0.049 0.212
Labor Earnings (0.034) (0.023) (0.024) (0.149) (0.098) (0.333)
Total Population 0.054 0.018 0.053 0.305 0.047 0.268
Hourly Wage (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.655) (0.163) (0.494)
Post-Tax Family 0.164 0.099 0.050 0.232 0.202 0.171
Disposable Income (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.056) (0.040) (0.044)
Pre-Tax Family 0.143 0.100 0.018 0.250 0.226 0.218
Labor Earnings (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.051) (0.047) (0.061)
Total Population 0.066 0.038 0.056 0.636 0.235 0.202
Hourly Wage (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.180) (0.053) (0.060)
Post-Tax Family -0.015 -0.006 0.012 -0.035 -0.022 0.005
Disposable Income (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.061) (0.044) (0.067)
Pre-Tax Family -0.034 -0.055 -0.007 -0.033 -0.023 0.007
Labor Earnings (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.071) (0.047) (0.073)
Total Population -0.022 -0.006 -0.012 -0.109 -0.032 -0.005
Hourly Wage (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.211) (0.072) (0.057)
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
Notes: See Tables 3A, 3B, and 4.  Each coefficient is the result of a separate regression with the inequality measure 
indicated by the row title and the sample design indicated by the column header.  Regressions include Demographic 
and Economic Mobility Controls, the log median income for each geographic region, geographic region fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects.  Median income covariates and geographic panel effects mirror the inequality measure 
employed.
Table 5: GSS Regressions with Extended Income Definitions and Regions
OLS IV
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification ResponsesTop marginal  Difference  Difference  State's own  State minimum State increase State total State direct
state tax rate btwn top and btwn top and top marginal wage level over the  public welfare  public welfare 
for wage inc. average rate, average rate, tax rate (incl. federal) federal expenditure expenditure
(incl. federal) nominal actual min wage per capita per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Regional 0.056 0.049 0.094 0.174 0.082 0.516 0.555 0.443
Gini Coefficient (0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.063) (0.031) (0.179) (0.065) (0.066)
Log Regional 0.035 0.038 0.066 0.099 0.048 0.303 0.373 0.266
80/20 Differential (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.061) (0.023) (0.153) (0.055) (0.046)
Log Regional 0.088 0.083 0.208 0.238 0.314 1.978 0.718 0.530
Gini Coefficient (0.042) (0.054) (0.082) (0.211) (0.048) (0.273) (0.119) (0.131)
Log Regional 0.066 0.062 0.151 0.179 0.236 1.487 0.540 0.399
80/20 Differential (0.033) (0.038) (0.048) (0.146) (0.038) (0.242) (0.078) (0.092)
Average Regional 0.018 0.024 0.026 0.062 0.028 0.179 0.046 0.027
Preference (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.030) (0.014) (0.081) (0.020) (0.022)
Average Regional 0.003 0.009 0.014 0.010 0.036 0.228 0.034 0.023
Preference (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.023) (0.011) (0.069) (0.016) (0.019)
Notes: Regressions consider connections between state-level policy outcomes and regional inequality.  Columns 1-4 consider tax code features taken from the NBER TAXSIM database.  
Columns 1-3 combine state and federal tax obligations to capture total tax liability in the state, inclusive of offsets between the state and federal obligations. Column 4 isolates the state's 
top marginal tax rate, and a zero value is given for states without income tax.  Column 5 considers the state minimum wage, with federal minimum wage being the floor for states 
without higher minimum wages.  Column 6 considers the gap between the state and federal levels, with an increase of zero for states that do not have higher minimum wages.  Columns 
7 and 8 consider total and direct public welfare expenditure per capita in the state.  Regressions include the log median income for each region, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects.  
Inequality measures are lagged one period.  Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard deviation.  Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.  Regressions in 
Panels A-D include 1,152 observations from the cross of 48 states (minus DC, AK, and HI) and 24 years.  Observations counts for actual differences in tax rates are 1,056 due to the 
outcome not being available in 1977. Regressions in Panels E and F have 864 and 720 observations, respectively, due to a reduced set of years in which the GSS surveyed the 
preference.
Table 6: Policy Regressions with Inequality and Social Preferences
A. Least Squares with Regional Gini Metric
B. Least Squares with Regional 80-20 Inequality
C. Instrumental Variables with Regional Gini Metric
D. Instrumental Variables with Regional 80-20 Inequality
E. Least Squares with Regional Welfare Spending Response Average
F. Least Squares with Regional Income Equalization Response Average1 Appendix: Introduction
This appendix provides additional materials for "Income Inequality and Social Preferences for
Redistribution and Compensation Di⁄erentials". The order of the appendix is:
￿ Dataset Construction
￿ Extended Empirical Results
￿ Extended Literature Notes
2 Dataset Construction
2.1 International Opinion Polls (ISSP and WVS)
The international exercises employ the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the
World Value Survey (WVS). To maintain a consistent presentation across international and
U.S. surveys, responses are ordered such that more-concerned views are associated with higher
numbers.
The ISSP analysis focuses on the 1987, 1992, and 1999 Social Inequality module; the Govern-
ment Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the 1985, 1990, and
1996 Role of the Government module. Responses to three complementary questions proxy social
preferences for government-led income redistribution: the ￿rst focusing on the responsibility of
the government in the transfer of income, the second considering progressive taxation, and the
third considering the acceptability of current income di⁄erences:
Q. (Government Responsibility) "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce
the di⁄erences in income between people with high incomes and those with low
incomes."
1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly
Q. (Progressive Taxation) "Do you think that people with high incomes should pay
a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share,
or a smaller share?"
1. Much smaller share
2. Smaller
3. The same share
14. Larger
5. Much larger share
Q. (Inequality Acceptance) "Are di⁄erences in income in <Respondent￿ s country>
too large?"
1. Disagree strongly
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly
Three important characteristics of these questions should be noted. They shy away from
sensitive wording (e.g., words like "welfare" carry negative connotations) and they o⁄er respon-
dents a range of options that include a neutral stance. The Government Responsibility and
Progressive Taxation questions also do not reference a country￿ s current policy position (e.g.,
"do you think the government should be doing more to reduce the di⁄erences..."). Such relative
questions are more di¢ cult to evaluate in panel exercises.
Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of occu-
pations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of current pay
scales. From these responses, a Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio is developed as
the log ratio of the wages suggested for a "doctor in general practice" and an "unskilled worker
in a factory". A higher ratio indicates a wider wage distribution (i.e., a ratio of one would
indicate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount). Note that while it is
possible that respondents interpret a proposed occupation like "unskilled worker in a factory"
di⁄erently based upon the country￿ s economic setting, most of our focus is on panel estimations
that control for time-invariant di⁄erences in this regard. The reported results winsorize the raw
ratio using the range [0.5, 100] prior to log transformation to limit the in￿ uence of outliers in
descriptive exercises like Table 1. Regression analyses are very robust to adjustments of this
procedure.
Other occupations present in all three Social Inequality surveys include a skilled factory
worker, a government minister, and a chairman of a large national company. When discussing
compensation di⁄erentials, the text also describes the evolution of the wage premiums between
these positions. Unfortunately, some surveys substitute a representative value for a salary
range or top code the maximum value. These adjustments have the most potential to in￿ u-
ence the chairman salary, which is why this study focuses more on the doctor wage rate. Sev-
eral techniques￿ dropping various survey years, using median estimations, imposing top codes,
winsorizing￿ demonstrate very similar outcomes to the primary panel.
Finally, two questions regarding the presence of con￿ icts between social groups are employed.
The ￿rst focuses on con￿ icts between the poor and the rich to validate respondents￿awareness
2of the inequality in their countries, while a second question regarding con￿ ict between young
and old people is considered as a falsi￿cation exercise.
Q. (Poor-Rich Con￿ ict) "In all countries there are di⁄erences or even con￿ icts be-
tween di⁄erent social groups. In your opinion, in <R￿ s country> how much con￿ ict
is there between poor people and rich people?"
1. No con￿ icts
2. Not very strong con￿ icts
3. Strong con￿ icts
4. Very strong con￿ icts
Q. (Young-Old Con￿ ict) "... between young people and older people?"
1. No con￿ icts
2. Not very strong con￿ icts
3. Strong con￿ icts
4. Very strong con￿ icts
As a complement to the ISSP, this study also considers responses to a question included
in the 1990, 1995, and 2000 rounds of the WVS. This question (WVS Income Equalization)
asks respondents to rate their views regarding income equalization on a ten-point scale. Ten
is labeled, "Incomes should be made more equal." One is labeled, "We need larger income
di⁄erences as incentives for individual e⁄ort." While the WVS panel enjoys a more-diverse
group of developing economies, interpretation of this question is limited by its reference to the
country￿ s current position (i.e., more equal, larger di⁄erences) and asymmetric labeling of the
two extreme values. Nevertheless, ￿nding quantitatively and qualitatively similar results in a
di⁄erent sample is an important robustness check.
2.2 International Inequality Series
This subsection details the construction of the international Gini estimates employed in the main
text. Nations participating in multiple International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or World
Values Survey (WVS) rounds are included, although the former is this study￿ s primary interest.
Table A1 documents the constructed series and outlines the data sources. Data collection relied
heavily on the United Nations Development Programme￿ s World Income Inequality Database
(versions 1.0 and 2.0c), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997,
2000), and the individual publications of national statistics agencies. The WIID1 includes the
earlier work of Deininger and Squire (1996) and was the original basis for this study. WIID2
is a 2008 revision that has been used to con￿rm the earlier series and extend where feasible to
include additional survey responses.1
1The task here is to develop Gini series covering the years included in the two survey programs. In doing
so, a longer horizon is often considered than what the surveys require for a particular country to establish more
3The target Gini concept is disposable household income based upon a nationally representa-
tive sample. Although many sources, including LIS, divide by the square root of the household
size, equivalency scales are not consistent across countries. Data limitations prevent consider-
ation of gross (pre-transfers) household-income inequality. Gross metrics have the theoretical
advantage of being less in￿ uenced by current and past preferences for redistribution, although
one can argue disposable-income di⁄erences are what respondents are recalling when questioned.
In the U.S. portion of this study, the form of inequality (e.g., gross versus disposable household
income, household labor earnings, hourly wage) is not critical for the results. A one-year lag in
inequality is targeted for each survey round, but contemporaneous and two-year or three-year
lagged measures are also accepted when necessary.
Selected series include multiple observations derived with a consistent technique and dataset.
Other sources not listed in Table A1 are also used to substantiate both levels and trends of the
chosen series, as well as to provide comparisons for how other income concepts are behaving
during the same period. In a number of cases, two or three series are pieced together to span the
time frame of this study (or as much of it as possible). In such cases, observations must share a
common or adjoining year as a levels check; moreover, overlapping intervals are examined when
available to ensure the series are following similar trends. Auxiliary series are also employed in
these exercises for veri￿cation purposes. Finally, the Gini estimates are rescaled to match the
levels of LIS estimates around 1990 if the LIS is not employed directly in the construction of the
series (participating countries only).
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) outline a number of pitfalls that can occur when piecing to-
gether series from secondary datasets. The dataset developed for this study attempts to address
these concerns while still assembling a meaningful panel of countries. However, it certainly falls
short of achieving "double harmonization" across countries and time, and Kerr (2005) identi￿es
questionable series due to poor quality data, alternative income concepts, splicing concerns, and
so on. The consistency of the results across the ISSP and WVS samples, dropping low-quality
series, and looking at harmonized U.S. inequalities should nevertheless instill con￿dence that the
￿ndings of this study are not the product of irregularities in the constructed series.2
2.3 U.S. Opinion Poll (GSS)
Social preferences for the United States are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS),
which has been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging
from 1400 to 3000 adults. This study focuses on a question that has been included for the full
term of the survey. The question gauges respondent attitudes towards spending more or less
money on welfare, while a similar question regarding spending for the space exploration program
con￿dence in the trends developed. These series, however, do not exhaust the inequality data available; gaps in
the sequences do not necessarily mean appropriate Gini estimates are not available.
2Macroeconomic covariates are taken from the United Nations. The sector distribution covariates employ the
"Value added, national currency, constant prices, by industry groups (WB estimates) [code 29915]" series.
4is used for contrast:
Q. (Welfare Spending) "Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about
the right amount on welfare?"
1. Too much
2. About right
3. Too little
While Figure 2 in the main text is representative, the mean regional responses should be
treated with caution. The sampling design of the GSS results in certain states or metropolitan
areas with distinct di⁄erences in social preferences from their surrounding region entering and
leaving the survey (e.g., the more-religious Utah in the West). While the regression results
control for these shifts, the regional mean responses do not.
A third question, included in most surveys since 1978, asks respondents to rate on a seven-
point scale how much the federal government should concern itself with the income di⁄erences
between the rich and poor (GSS Income Equalization). Seven is labeled, "The government ought
to reduce income di⁄erences between the rich and poor." One is labeled, "The government should
not concern itself with reducing income di⁄erences."
For both the Welfare Spending and GSS Income Equalization questions, alternative versions
are included in some years (e.g., substituting "assistance to the poor" for "welfare"). As the
mean responses shift signi￿cantly with these alternative word choices, these questions are not
incorporated; a visual check indicates trends for these alternative questions mirror those of the
main questions. It should also be noted that the Welfare Spending question references current
policies. Luttmer (2001) considers several corrections for this relative inquiry, ￿nding his results
using the base question alone are robust. This study does not attempt any such corrections.
Finally, respondents since 1972 are asked their political-party preference and the strength of
this association on a seven-point scale.
Q. (Party Identi￿cation) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"
1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican
3. Independent, close to Republican
4. Independent (Neither, No Response)
5. Independent, close to Democrat
6. Not very strong Democrat
7. Strong Democrat
52.4 U.S. Inequality Series
There are many forms of inequality: hourly wage, annual wage, total income, wealth, and
consumption inequality, in addition to other variants (e.g., before and after tax, individual
versus household). These forms of inequality are related to each other, but they are also distinct
from conceptual and empirical perspectives. The international portion of this study is limited
to income inequality due to simple data constraints, while the U.S. analysis can consider more
options. From a welfare perspective, long-term consumption inequality is the most natural
link. In terms of the formation of social preferences, the discussion below mostly emphasizes
income inequality as being the clearest metric available, but there is ambiguity. This discussion
highlights some key issues involved and describes alternative estimates.
For a conceptual perspective, many foundational models for redistribution do not have rel-
evant distinctions in this regard. As a classic example, the median-voter model has a simple
income level before redistribution, abstracting from labor-leisure decisions, consumption inequal-
ity, and wealth accumulation. In dynamic models, the distinctions become more relevant. For
example, in the permanent-income-hypothesis model, what matters most is lifetime consumption,
with income variations being smoothed over. This might suggest it is most important to focus
on long-term consumption patterns, and that income volatility might obscure this consumption
baseline. On the other hand, annual levels of consumption may themselves have even greater
scope for mis-measuring long-term consumption (e.g., di⁄erent consumption bundles, discrete
purchases, variations in time discounting). Perhaps even more important, the conceptual focus
is on pre-transfers inequality, and yet this is impossible ex post to distinguish for consumption
inequality. Likewise, it is quite reasonable to focus on inequality in wage opportunities, given
that both income and consumption inequality include a labor-leisure trade-o⁄that in some cases
is being chosen by individuals with di⁄erent utility functions.
In contrast to this conceptual ambiguity, most public expressions of inequality and concern
over it have focused on income equality. One of the ￿rst expressions comes from Plato, who
argued that the income di⁄erences between the richest and poorest in society should not exceed
￿ve-fold. Similarly, over the last three decades, two of the most consistent benchmarks used when
discussing inequality have been the CEO pay ratio to the average employee and the stagnating
median income levels in the United States. Both metrics have the bene￿ts of being simple to
understand and readily available from publicly available data. Likewise, popular accounts of
inequality focus on income, from sports stars￿contracts to the Wall Street Journal￿ s annual
report of average compensation of Goldman Sachs employees. Most recently, the top 1% has
become a major focal point, with the phrase alternatively being applied to income or wealth.
Wealth inequality is implicitly expressed in rankings of the "richest people in the world", but
perhaps surprisingly this has been typically less linked to unfair inequality than the CEO pay
ratio, for example.
Similarly, most policy interventions towards the rich are income based. This is easily observed
6in the strong debates over the progressivity of the tax code. Direct wealth taxes are rarely used,
although property taxes have some connection to this concept. Consumption tax is also rarely
viewed as means for rectifying inequality, although luxury taxes do exist in some locations (e.g.,
a higher tax rate for very expensive automobiles). In this context, it is particularly notable
from the social surveys themselves that all of the questions focus on income levels rather than
consumption or wealth. One exception is that near the poverty line, the focus of society and
policy often shifts towards minimum support levels.
From this background and due also simply to data strength as described below, this study
focuses most on income and wage inequality. Three levels of geographic aggregation and three
forms of inequality are considered for the United States. On the geographic dimension, inequality
estimates for Census regions (four or nine) are calculated from the March CPS ￿les. These annual
measures are preferred since decade-based measurements can miss important ￿ uctuations, most
noticeably the signi￿cant expansion in family-income inequality during the recessions of the early
1980s and 1990s. The sample sizes of the March CPS are insu¢ cient, however, for state-level
analyses and states are not identi￿ed until 1977. State-level statistics are instead calculated
from the Census for each decade.
Three income de￿nitions are considered: post-tax disposable family income from all sources,
pre-tax family labor earnings, and hourly wages. The ￿rst two family measures are calculated
over family equivalents using Danziger and Gottschalk￿ s (1995) procedure of dividing by an
in￿ ation-adjusted poverty-line estimate for a family of similar composition (i.e., the number
and ages of adults and children in the family unit). Additional procedures for preparing the
sample (e.g., the exclusion of military families, adjustment of top-codes) follow Danziger and
Gottschalk (1995), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), and Katz and Autor (1999). In each analy-
sis, the region ￿xed e⁄ects and median income levels are adjusted to the appropriate geographic
aggregation; median income levels are additionally adjusted to re￿ ect the income de￿nition used
in the inequality calculation. Table A2 documents the log 80-20 income ratios employed in the
primary estimations. Later in this appendix the robustness of the results over these de￿nitions
is described.
Beyond these metrics, the study also compared income inequality to consumption inequality.
There are several basic empirical challenges to describe ￿rst. To begin, debate exists about the
measurement of consumption inequality for the United States over post-war period. Recent work
suggests high correlation in the macro-trends between income and consumption inequality (e.g.,
Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri 2012), while others point to substantially lower consumption
trends (e.g., Krueger and Perri 2006). The study follows Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) in using
food consumption inequality from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This approach
was needed to provide a comparable baseline across the sample period. It comes with several
important caveats. First, food expenditures represent a narrow slice of the overall basket on
which consumption can expand. Second, the PSID is not designed to be a representative sample
7of geographic regions (or even the United States over time). Finally, and most essential for
this purpose, food expenditure is directly in￿ uenced by policy (e.g., food stamps to counteract
imbalances forming) and the data do not separate these interventions over the period, re￿ ective
of the conceptual issue noted above about the inability to separate pre-transfers consumption
inequality.
With these caveats, we estimate from the PSID a food consumption di⁄erential similar to our
80-20 income di⁄erential. This series has a 0.7 correlation to our main inequality metric across
regions and years, and Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri (2012) and Attanasio and Pistaferri
(2012) calculate a similar correlation across other datasets. This correlation is much lower,
however, at 0.2 or less when looking at longitudinal changes in inequality and their regional
di⁄erences (i.e., residuals from regressions of the inequality variables on region and year ￿xed
e⁄ects, which is the e⁄ective variation used in the estimations).
This limited panel correlation allows the two forms of inequality to be tested against each
other. Including this variable in our estimations shows primarily that the income inequality
metric has the tighter link to social preferences. Second, for support for income equalization,
consumption inequality has some additional predictive power beyond the income inequality mea-
sure. For welfare support, this relationship is ambiguous over speci￿cations, likely in part due
to welfare support directly determining food consumption for poor (lower local support per our
policy analysis almost directly translates into greater realized food expenditure inequality given
the role of food stamps and similar).
On the whole, these extra analyses empirically suggest that income inequality has the stronger
link to social preferences. This study is very cautious about these results, however, due to the
uncertainty about how best to measure these patterns. Said perhaps more colorfully, if there is
substantial disagreement over whether the consumption inequality trend for the United States is
￿ at or rising, regional-based comparisons of longitudinal changes are likely to be mis-measured.
Thus, the better performance of income inequality econometrically could be simply due to its
better measurement and substantially higher quality data. It is hope that future work can
continue to clarify these features.
2.5 U.S. Minimum Wage Instrument
The inequality instrument for region r and year t takes the form
INEQ ￿ IVr;t = ln(FED1970=FEDt) ￿ E1970COVr;t:
This instrument builds upon the fact that regions di⁄er in the composition of their economic
activity, and the federal minimum-wage mandates are not applied equally to industries (e.g.,
1970-2000 coverage rates in agriculture averaged 41% versus manufacturing￿ s 97%). The larger
the fraction of a region￿ s population covered by the federal statutes, the more impact federal
rates have on the local economy. The simplest interaction term would be the 1970 coverage rate;
8in a slight design improvement, the interaction term is built instead as the expected coverage
in year t for each region. This modi￿cation allows incorporation of trends in national coverage
rates due to changing federal legislation (especially in the mid 1970s), thereby raising the quality
of the ￿rst-stage estimations.
The expected coverage ratio is E1970COVr;t = 1￿
P
j IND%j;r;1970￿(COVj;1970=COVj;t), with
j indexing industries. This term is estimated from the 1970 industrial composition of the working
poor and changes in national coverage rates by industry. IND%j;r;1970 is the percent of a region￿ s
workforce from the 1970 Census who are both earning less than the minimum wage and working
in industry j. By itself,
P
j IND%j;r;1970 would produce the actual percentage of the region￿ s
working population earning less than the federal minimum wage in 1970. COVj;1970=COVj;t is the
ratio of the national coverage rate for industry j in 1970 to that in year t. From a starting value
of one, the ratio moves above one for industries where the coverage rates decrease compared to
1970 levels; it moves below one when coverage rates increase.
The combination of these terms is the expected percentage of a region￿ s workforce earning be-
low the minimum wage in year t. The starting 1970 level of
P
j IND%j;r;1970￿(COVj;1970=COVj;t)
is still the actual workforce percentage earning below the 1970 federal rate in each region (as the
coverage ratio for all industries is one). For subsequent years, it is expected that the percentage
of the population earning below the minimum wage will decline in region r if its poor workers
were primarily employed in industries where the coverage rate later increased. On the other
hand, little change is expected in states or regions where very few workers were initially below
the minimum wage or where the poor worked in industries for which the coverage rate did not
change signi￿cantly. Finally, 1 ￿
P
j IND%j;r;1970 ￿ (COVj;1970=COVj;t) estimates the percent of
the population covered by the minimum-wage mandates and thus the potential importance of
changes in the federal rate for the region￿ s inequality level.
When developing the instrument, baseline coverage rates COVj;1970=COVj;t are at the one-
digit SIC level and exclude government employees (e.g., Nordlund 1997, United States Depart-
ment of Labor 1998). Coverage rates have not been identi￿ed for 1989 or after 1996. For the
main estimations, a linear interpolation is employed for 1989 and observations post-1997 are
assigned 1996 values; the results are robust to dropping these missing years. Unfortunately, the
coverage data are not disaggregated to where each observation￿ s own region could be excluded.
The expected coverage rate calculations produce only a slight trend vis-￿-vis ￿xed 1970 levels.
The instrument is then the interaction of shifts in the real federal rate with the expected
coverage level, or how much the federal legislation matters for a region. The instrument comes
only from the interaction between these two elements. The individual trends of the real federal
rate and industry coverage rates are absorbed by the year e⁄ects. Geographic ￿xed e⁄ects control
for the region￿ s predetermined industrial composition of poor workers. This latter control is
important as the inequality of regions may in￿ uence industrial composition over a su¢ ciently long
time horizon. For example, ￿rms in certain industries may adjust location choices in response, or
9policy interventions to ￿ght poverty/inequality may push workers into certain industries. The
interaction approach keeps the instrument￿ s regional component ￿xed at the pre-determined
1970 level to circumvent these issues, and the geographic ￿xed e⁄ects control for this trait.
Table A2 also provides the federal minimum wage ratios and expected regional coverage ratios
used to construct the minimum-wage instrument employed in the U.S. analysis. The instrument
does not have a level per se￿ its value for all regions is zero when the real federal rate is equal to
its 1970 level (i.e., 1970 itself, approximately so in 1975, 1976 and 1981). It relies on the region
￿xed e⁄ects to control for the mean inequality positions of each area. Finally, the instrument is
designed to have a positive ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient. The E1970COVr;t term is always positive and
only governs the magnitude of the response; the ln(FED1970=FEDt) component is positive when
the current federal rate is below its 1970 level, which should correspond to rising inequality, and
vice versa.
The robustness of the instrument design has been veri￿ed on several dimensions. First, the
results are mostly robust to simply ￿xing the coverage rate at its 1970 level for each region; the
only trouble spot is in regressions that contain only year and region ￿xed e⁄ects, as the simpler
interaction captures some of the median-income level trend when it is excluded. Second, the
total industrial composition of the region can be substituted for the industrial composition of
the poor workers. Finally, as noted above, the instrument incorporates two aggregate trends￿
changes in the federal rate and changes in industry coverage rates. Close observation shows
the instrument can work against itself. Focusing on movements in the minimum-wage level,
the instrument correctly predicts regions with higher coverage levels will be more a⁄ected by
federal changes. Yet, over a short horizon and holding the minimum wage ￿xed, the instrument
incorrectly predicts an increase in the coverage rate will raise inequality if the real federal rate
is below its 1970 level; its predicted direction is correct if the real federal rate is above its
1970 level. An alternative speci￿cation removes the competing e⁄ects by using two instruments,
one interacting the dynamics of the federal rate with ￿xed 1970 coverage rates and the second
interacting industry coverage rate trends with the 1970 industrial composition. The results are
again very close to those presented in the main text.
3 Extended Empirical Results
3.1 International Preferences
Coe¢ cients on the Demographic and Work Controls in Table 2 of the main text follow the pat-
terns found in previous cross-sectional studies (e.g., Suhrcke 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005).
As the quality of income data varies substantially across surveys and countries, respondents are
grouped into family-income quintiles for each survey year. Support for redistribution declines
with income; support also tends to be lower among male and more-educated respondents. Self-
employed workers and supervisors tend to have less support for redistribution, while unemployed
10workers and union members are more supportive. While reasonable, the direction of these ￿nd-
ings should be treated with caution as income variation not captured by the quintile groupings
may be loading onto other demographic and work characteristics. Finally, race/minority status
is not included in the demographics; later results indicate this is an important factor for the
United States (e.g., Luttmer 2001, Luttmer and Singhal 2011, Fong and Luttmer 2011).
Four basic robustness checks on Table 2 are worth mentioning. First, regressions employ the
logarithm of the Gini coe¢ cient so that the magnitudes of the ￿ coe¢ cients are less sensitive to
the outcomes of countries with extremely large inequality levels. This is not a very important
adjustment, and Table A3 provides results with the base Gini coe¢ cient. The same robustness
applies to the U.S. estimations. Second, very similar results are also obtained without the
macroeconomic controls. For example, elasticities for Government Responsibility and Proposed
Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio are 0.161 (0.057) and 0.260 (0.076), respectively, when
only considering inequality and country and year ￿xed e⁄ects. Third, the ISSP and WVS have
sample weights that prohibit bootstrapping. Estimations that exclude the sample weights and
bootstrap con￿rm Table 2￿ s ￿ndings, with the results stronger and more precisely estimated.
Finally, the 1990 and 1995 WVS surveys asked respondents to rate whether hard work or luck
determines success or failure. The reported WVS results are robust to focusing on these survey
years and including this control.
The sample employed in Table 2 builds o⁄ of the ISSP Social Inequality module. The
Government Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the Role of
the Government modules since 1985. A longer panel can be constructed that combines surveys
from these two modules. While the panel enjoys more countries and higher-frequency variation in
macroeconomic conditions, it unfortunately lacks the important Mobility Controls. The ￿ndings
from this longer panel mirror those in Table 2. A second version of the Government Responsibility
question is also included in the Role of the Government surveys and the ISSP Religion modules.
Results from this third panel are also consistent with those presented in Table 2. The stability
of the ￿ndings through shifting time intervals and countries surveyed speaks to the robustness
of the measured short-run response in redistribution preferences.
Finally, the U.S. results show shifts in party identi￿cation with higher inequality. Increases
in inequality are also associated with shifts in party identi￿cation to the left in the ISSP and
WVS samples. These results are not emphasized due to the lack of party comparability across
countries compared to the U.S. analysis. There is also intriguing evidence of declines in political
participation as inequality increases.
3.2 U.S. Inequality Disaggregation
The reported analysis focuses on inequality estimates that measure overall inequality. A detailed
exploration should further identify the subsets of the income distribution that are most important
for changes in social preferences. While more-disaggregated international statistics are very rare
11and typically of poor quality, U.S. data are available. Table A4 reports results that decompose
the 80-20 inequality into the 80-50 and 50-20 di⁄erentials. The results suggest that trends in
inequality in the lower half of the distribution (i.e., the poor being increasingly left behind) are
most responsible for the aggregate results previously identi￿ed for the United States. Using
90-50 and 50-10 trends, which demonstrate less co-movement than the 80-50 and 50-20 series,
yields signi￿cant results for the 50-10 ratio in all regressions (including Income Equalization).
Table A5 shows the instrumental variables analysis with the 80-20 income di⁄erential.
Mo¢ tt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) ￿nd evidence that declining welfare-bene￿t levels can
be linked to declining low-skill wages, as voters seek to maintain a target bene￿t-wage ratio
(perhaps to preserve equity between working and non-working poor or to minimize employment
disincentives). The disaggregated income inequality results￿ in particular, the positive and
signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the 50-20 ratio￿ are robust to including measures of the 15th or 25th
percentile wages.
3.3 U.S. Spatial Sorting Analysis
It is important to discuss whether spatial sorting may play a role in these results￿ for example,
the migration of poor to a location could simultaneously weaken the local income distribution
and increase support for redistribution. Similar to the country-level analysis in Figure 1, regions
in the United States tend to have the cross-sectional pattern of places with higher inequality in
the United States being less supportive for redistribution, which would not be consistent with
this sorting model for all income groups. Yet, the longitudinal variation utilized in the main
analysis could be. It is important to ￿rst note that the estimations are designed to the limit the
scope for the results being driven by endogenous spatial sorting. In particular, the covariates
in the analysis control for observables that link to persistent welfare choices (e.g., income, age,
gender, race, education). Thus, to the extent that these factors are behind the endogenous
sorting, per the migration of the poor example above, the estimations directly control for these
traits regardless of where the individual lives. Likewise, the instrumental variables analysis can
overcome this bias.
These controls, however, cannot capture sorting due to unmeasured philosophical bent. Could
this still explain it? As the GSS does not contain spatial mobility data, this is ultimately
unobservable. Two observations, however, suggest that this role is minimal. First, the aggregate
swings in Figure 2 cannot be explained by migration due to their substantial size, both at the
macro-level and at the local level and the shift across regions. This is prima facie evidence of
attitudinal adjustments among non-movers being important.
Second, Table A6 provides calculations from the 2000 Census of Populations (IPUMS 5%
state sample) that suggests sorting is not a key factor. The sample is restricted to individuals
over 18 years of age who were born in the United States and not living in group quarters. IPUMS
reports place of birth and current residence, and 79% of individuals are living in region of birth
12(64% in state of birth). For each respondent, coe¢ cient values on demographic covariates from
GSS-based regressions for welfare spending support are used to predict baseline support for
welfare spending. Values in the table are averages for cells based upon region of birth and region
of current residence in 2000. Included covariates for prediction are indicator variables for income
levels, age, education, gender, and marital status (the covariates from Column 2 of Table 3A).
The coe¢ cient values were originally centered around zero (the transformation of preferences
to have mean zero and unit standard deviation in Table 3A), with the slight di⁄erence in this
table (overall average of 0.004) coming due to the out-of-sample application to the 2000 Census.
The higher average values for the South and West are also observed in the GSS, which is good
con￿rmation since this was not targeted in the application.
The table ￿rst shows that migrants from region of birth tend to be less supportive in terms
of their demographic covariates for redistribution (e.g., re￿ ective of higher income groups being
more likely to migrate). The table second shows that the migrants towards regions with the
most substantial support based upon demographics (South and West) are not themselves of a
demographic bias to accentuate the preference structure of the destination region. For example,
migrants from the Midwest and Northeast to the West tend to have the lowest predicted support
for redistribution based upon covariates. Caution is warranted about a very strong interpretation
of these patterns as the explanatory variables have a 5% adjusted R2 (8% with region and year
￿xed e⁄ects). But, these patterns do suggest that any bias in the work due to endogenous sorting
is very minor given how fundamental these traits themselves are for preferences.3
3.4 U.S. Respondent Heterogeneity
Two additional extensions reported in Kerr (2005) consider whether the average increase in
support for redistribution with rising inequality masks di⁄erences among income classes. While
the demographic characteristics of respondents are statistically signi￿cant for explaining survey
answers, Piketty (1996a,b, 1999a) notes the overall level of disagreement within a country about
distributive equality is usually small vis-￿-vis other social issues (e.g., death penalty). Section 2
found, however, that perceptions of con￿ ict between the poor and the rich increase with rising
inequality, and it is important to clarify if the average response belies increasing disagreement
among classes about appropriate redistribution levels. The rich may become more protective of
their wealth as the gap grows, perhaps out of concern over larger transfers or perhaps out of
reduced fear that they too may one day be poor. Altruistic motives, however, may yield greater
assistance from the wealthy as disparity widens.
A ￿rst test for this heterogeneity interacts the inequality measures with whether respondents
are in the top-two income quintiles or the bottom-two income quintiles. These estimations do
not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences by class for the GSS Welfare Spending or Income Equalization
variables. These coe¢ cient magnitudes are very small, and the standard errors are tightly
3Glaeser (2011) further discusses spatial mobility and the limits of redistribution at the local level.
13estimated. Similar null results for income-quintile interactions are also present in the ISSP and
WVS. Concern over rising inequality grows in all income groups (while the overall levels are
higher in poor households). GSS respondents in the bottom-two quintiles are disproportionately
more likely to align themselves with the Democratic Party as inequalities in their regions increase.
This result, however, is sensitive to more structured controls like interacting a time trend with
being in the upper-two or lower-two income quintiles, suggesting that other factors may be
playing a role.4
A second test interacts the inequality measures with whether the respondent lives near some-
one of the opposite race. Luttmer (2001) ￿nds support for welfare spending increases as the share
of local recipients from a respondent￿ s racial group rises. Lind (2007) also ￿nds aggregate ev-
idence that inequality between racial groups versus inequality within racial groups can have
opposite e⁄ects for redistribution outcomes. The interacted coe¢ cient for the Welfare Spending
regression agrees with these studies￿ the increase in redistribution support associated with ris-
ing inequality is diminished in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. There is no clear e⁄ect for
the Income Equalization measure.
These results suggest changes in support for government-led redistribution are fairly uniform
across income groups. This ￿nding is in agreement with Rawlsian models like Piketty (1995),
where di⁄erent classes have similar views on distributive equality holding ￿xed beliefs about
incentive costs. On the other hand, the standard median-voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richard
1981) suggests increases in inequality lead to a divergence in preferences for redistribution as
gaps to the median income widen. A limitation to these ￿ndings, however, is important to note.
Piketty and Saez (2003) ￿nd a tremendous increase in the concentration of wealth among the very
rich in the United States (i.e., the top 1% and even smaller fractions). Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez (2011) review the work that has followed regarding top income shares. Unfortunately, the
data cannot be used for an analysis for these super-wealthy individuals, executive compensation
committees, and similar institutions.
4 Extended Literature Notes
Space constraints required a substantially shorter bibliography than was included in the working
papers. Below is a complete list.
￿ Footnote 1: Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008), Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), and
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) provide recent surveys of various inequality determinants
from labor and macroeconomic perspectives. A small sample of the work includes Rosen
(1981); Bok (1993); Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); Frank and Cook (1995); Katz
4McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2003) note increases in U.S. inequality have moved in tandem with stronger
ideological di⁄erences over redistribution and more-polarized party politics. While income has become a stronger
predictor of party a¢ liation over the last twenty-￿ve years, their work also suggests inequality bears limited
responsibility for the polarization.
14and Murphy (1995); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Kremer and Maskin (1996),
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Lee (1999); Buchinsky and Hunt (1999); Krusell et.
al. (2000); Card (2001); Card and Lemieux (2001); Acemoglu (2002); Card and DiNardo
(2002); Rotemberg (2002); Clark (2003); Piketty and Saez (2003); Card, Lemieux, and
Riddell (2004); Guadalupe (2007); Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008); Lemieux (2008);
Autor, Manning, and Smith (2010); and Autor and Dorn (2011). Glaeser (2006) further
discusses the di⁄erences between the United States and Europe on inequality.
￿ References for the minimum wage work include Card and Krueger (1995); DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (1996); Lee (1999); Golan, Perlo⁄, and Wu (2001a,b); Card and DiNardo
(2002); Autor, Manning, and Smith (2010); and Ahn, Arcidiacono, and Wessels (2011).
￿ Work on social strati￿cation includes Putnam (2000); Benabou (1993, 1996); and Bertrand,
Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000).
￿ References for recent policy examples include Rodriguez (1999); Piketty (1999b); Caminada
and Goudswaard (2001); Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003); Hassler et. al. (2003);
Gundersen and Ziliak (2004); Chernick (2005); Schwabish, Smeeding, and Osberg (2006);
Leigh (2008); Schwabish (2008); Corbae, D￿ Erasmo, and Kuruscu (2009); Boustan et al.
(2010); Corcoran and Evans (2010); and Cooper, Lutz, and Palumbo (2011).
￿ Examples regarding the franchising groups favoring higher redistribution and the dispro-
portionate in￿ uence of elites include Husted and Kenny (1997); Lott and Kenny (1999);
and Saint-Paul (2001).
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Table A1: Gini CoefficientsCountry 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ITA 30.9 30.3 28.4 28.9 29.8 29.9 29.9 31.6 29.3 28.9 32.2 32.0 32.9 31.6
JAP 28.0 29.3 29.7 30.1
KOR 34.9 31.2 30.4 29.5 28.7 28.4 28.1 28.5 28.4 29.1 28.3 31.6 32.0 31.7
LTU 26.0 37.2 34.9 34.1 35.0
LVA 22.5 22.5 29.6 24.5 30.7 31.7 32.2
MEX 44.8 46.7 48.5 49.6 47.7 49.4
NGA 45.0 45.0 50.6
NLD 23.9 23.5 24.7 25.6 25.5 25.8 26.6 27.8 27.7 27.8 28.3 28.0
NOR 22.5 22.2 22.3 21.9 23.4 22.8 23.3 23.7 24.3 25.4 24.8 25.7 26.1
NZL 25.9 26.0 25.3 25.8 28.0 29.9 30.7 29.9 31.8 31.0 31.8 32.2 33.1
PHL 44.6 44.5 46.8 45.1 48.7 48.2
POL 27.7 28.1 27.6 28.6 26.5 27.4 36.2 37.3 36.9 37.8 39.0
ROM 22.6 35.2 35.8
RUS 26.5 28.5 26.5 28.9 39.8 40.9 38.1 37.5 37.5 37.9 39.4
SVK 18.1 17.8 18.0 18.6 19.7 20.8 20.0 24.8 23.4
SVN 19.0 20.1 22.7 22.6 25.0 22.0 23.4 24.0 25.0 24.9
SWE 19.7 21.8 22.1 22.3 23.7 22.9 23.4 26.2 23.3 24.3 26.2 25.4 26.7
TUR 43.6 41.5 40.0
USA 31.2 31.5 32.3 32.5 32.5 33.0 33.2 33.3 33.4 33.9 33.6 33.6 34.1 35.6 35.8 35.3 34.5 35.0 35.1
ZAF 63.0 59.0 57.8
Table A1: Gini Coefficients (continued)
Notes:  Table documents country-year Gini observations used with ISSP and WVS estimations.  The target Gini estimates are one-year lags from the survey date, although 
contemporaneous or two-year or three-year lags are accepted when necessary.  Survey responses are dropped if they do not meet these conditions.  Kerr (2005) provides 
greater details on these calculations.Country Sources
ARG (Argentina) WIID1 (5 NOOK)
AUS (Australia) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, Statistics Australia (2002)
AUT (Austria) LIS, WIID1 (4), WIID2 (1)
BEL (Belgium) LIS
BGR (Bulgaria) WIID1 (1), World Bank
BLR (Belarus) WIID1 (5), WIID2 (2)
BRA (Brazil) WIID1 (1)
CAN (Canada) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, Rupnik et al. (2001)
CHE (Switzerland) LIS
CHL (Chile) WIID1 (1), WIID2 (2)
CHN (China) WIID1 (1)
CZE (Czech Rep.) LIS, WIID1 (1), WIID2 (1,2)
DEU (W. Germany) Frick and Grabka (2002), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1)
DNK (Denmark) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS
ESP (Spain) Fanjul and Renes (2002), LIS, WIID2 (1)
EST (Estonia) WIID1 (1)
FIN (Finland) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), WIID1 (1)
FRA (France) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID2 (2)
GBR (Great Britain) Goodman (2001), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000)
HUN (Hungary) LIS, WIID1 (1)
IND (India) WIID1 (3), WIID2 (2)
IRL (Ireland) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1), WIID2 (1)
ISR (Israel) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS
ITA (Italy) Brandolini (1999), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), WIID2 (1)
JAP (Japan) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Statistics Japan (2002)
KOR (South Korea) WIID1 (1), Statistics Korea (2002)
LTU (Lithuania) WIID1 (4), WIID2 (2)
LVA (Latvia) WIID1 (4)
MEX (Mexico) LIS
NGA (Nigeria) WIID1 (1)
NLD (Netherlands) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID2 (1)
NOR (Norway) Brandolini (1999), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Statistics Norway (2002), WIID1 (1)
NZL (New Zealand) Statistics New Zealand (1999)
PHL (Philippines) Statistics Philippines (2002)
POL (Poland) LIS, WIID1 (1)
ROM (Romania) WIID2 (2)
RUS (Russia) LIS, Ovtcharova (2001)
SVK (Slovakia) WIID1 (1)
SVN (Slovenia) LIS, WIID1 (1,4)
SWE (Sweden) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1)
TUR (Turkey) WIID2 (3)
USA (United States) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), United States Census Bureau (2000)
ZAF (South Africa) WIID1 (1), WIID2 (3)
Table A1: Gini Coefficients (continued)Nominal Real Log Ratio
Year M. Wage M. Wage to 1970 Northeast Midwest South West Northeast Midwest South West
1970 1.60 5.03 0.00 89.9 87.1 78.4 87.2 0.500 0.487 0.638 0.527
1971 1.60 4.81 0.04 89.9 87.1 78.3 87.2 0.509 0.495 0.649 0.555
1972 1.60 4.59 0.09 89.9 87.1 78.3 87.2 0.525 0.515 0.635 0.557
1973 1.60 4.46 0.12 90.2 87.5 78.9 87.6 0.532 0.504 0.649 0.597
1974 2.00 5.25 -0.04 90.3 87.7 79.2 87.8 0.525 0.503 0.628 0.578
1975 2.10 5.01 0.00 90.4 87.8 79.3 87.9 0.540 0.503 0.632 0.572
1976 2.30 5.07 -0.01 90.5 87.9 79.6 88.0 0.554 0.523 0.633 0.592
1977 2.30 4.80 0.05 90.6 88.0 79.6 88.1 0.553 0.528 0.634 0.576
1978 2.65 5.20 -0.03 90.7 88.2 79.8 88.2 0.569 0.536 0.640 0.592
1979 2.90 5.45 -0.08 90.7 88.2 79.8 88.2 0.565 0.523 0.646 0.589
1980 3.10 5.33 -0.06 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.574 0.538 0.646 0.593
1981 3.35 5.18 -0.03 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.577 0.550 0.659 0.605
1982 3.35 4.74 0.06 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.581 0.567 0.678 0.627
1983 3.35 4.48 0.12 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.601 0.587 0.690 0.652
1984 3.35 4.30 0.16 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.630 0.608 0.692 0.662
1985 3.35 4.13 0.20 90.9 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.631 0.601 0.685 0.644
1986 3.35 4.00 0.23 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.633 0.612 0.690 0.662
1987 3.35 3.93 0.25 90.9 88.5 80.2 88.5 0.617 0.609 0.706 0.670
1988 3.35 3.80 0.28 90.9 88.5 80.3 88.5 0.618 0.626 0.713 0.667
1989 3.35 3.66 0.32 90.9 88.5 80.3 88.6 0.619 0.612 0.713 0.674
1990 3.80 3.99 0.23 90.9 88.5 80.3 88.6 0.640 0.607 0.699 0.673
1991 4.25 4.25 0.17 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.638 0.627 0.687 0.682
1992 4.25 4.10 0.20 90.9 88.4 80.1 88.5 0.650 0.628 0.697 0.698
1993 4.25 4.00 0.23 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.650 0.637 0.719 0.698
1994 4.25 3.90 0.25 90.9 88.4 80.1 88.5 0.666 0.652 0.726 0.722
1995 4.25 3.82 0.27 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.678 0.630 0.705 0.745
1996 4.75 4.17 0.19 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.675 0.616 0.698 0.733
1997 5.15 4.40 0.13 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.689 0.617 0.702 0.739
1998 5.15 4.31 0.15 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.698 0.610 0.706 0.723
1999 5.15 4.25 0.17 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.702 0.621 0.702 0.731
2000 5.15 4.16 0.19 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.696 0.623 0.693 0.721
Table A2: Minimum-Wage Instrument Descriptive Statistics
Expected Coverage Ratios Log 80-20 Family Disposable IncomeBase Base Including Including Including
Regression Regression Worker OECD-Yr. Trans.-Yr.
Controls Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
National Gini 0.162 0.156 0.159 0.128 0.085
Coefficient (0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.066) (0.068)
Observations 54,054 45,918 45,918 45,918 45,918
National Gini 0.261 0.264 0.264 0.214 0.214
Coefficient (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.079) (0.100)
National Gini 0.145 0.128 0.131 0.069 0.043
Coefficient (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.053) (0.076)
National Gini 0.138 0.155 0.155 0.140 0.153
Coefficient (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.034) (0.044)
National Gini -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.085 -0.013
Coefficient (0.055) (0.051) (0.050) (0.081) (0.078)
National Gini 0.239 0.223 0.225 0.303 0.231
Coefficient (0.106) (0.097) (0.095) (0.104) (0.110)
National Gini 0.393 0.404 0.402 0.373 0.287
Coefficient (0.114) (0.119) (0.119) (0.127) (0.140)
Observations 137,006 118,499 118,499 118,499 118,499
Table A3: Table 2 with Non-Log Gini Coefficient
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
ISSP Social Inequality Panel
A. Government Responsibility Responses
B. Progressive Taxation Responses
C. Inequality Acceptance Responses
D. Poor-Rich Conflict Responses
E. Young-Old Conflict Responses
F. Log Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Wage Ratio Responses
WVS Panel
G. WVS Income Equalization Responses
Notes: See Table 2. Variables transformed to have unit standard deviation to aid interpretation.Base Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.001
80/50 Differential (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Log Regional 0.072 0.084 0.098 0.086
50/20 Differential (0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.027)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.067 0.042 0.042 0.028
80/50 Differential (0.032) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
Log Regional 0.046 0.011 0.020 0.007
50/20 Differential (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.036 0.035 0.002 0.015
80/50 Differential (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024)
Log Regional 0.093 0.114 0.137 0.118
50/20 Differential (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791
Log Regional 0.017 0.002 -0.008 0.010
80/50 Differential (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036)
Log Regional -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016
50/20 Differential (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: See Table 3B. 
Table A4: Table 3B with Disaggregated Inequality
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.204 0.206 0.207 0.200
80/20 Differential (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.067)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.128 0.070 0.083 0.055
80/20 Differential (0.090) (0.091) (0.109) (0.080)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.209 0.232 0.196 0.224
80/20 Differential (0.050) (0.053) (0.060) (0.062)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,971
Log Regional -0.054 -0.035 -0.034 -0.038
80/20 Differential (0.066) (0.065) (0.077) (0.068)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
Notes: See Table 4. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, the first-stage 
coefficient for the regional log 80-20 differential is 1.53 (0.53), with an F statistic of 7.3 and a partial R² of 
0.10.
Table A5: Table 4 with 80-20 Income Differential Inequality
Including Demographic & Economic Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification ResponsesMidwest Northeast South West Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Region of Birth:
Midwest -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.017 -0.004
Northeast -0.008 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 -0.003
South 0.001 0.006 0.013 -0.003 0.011
West 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.016 0.016
Total -0.001 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.004
Notes: Tabulations assess the extent to which regional mobility influences observed changes in social preferences. The 
sample is from the 2000 Census of Populations 5% state public-use file. All respondents born in the United States over the 
age of 18 and not living in group quarters are retained. For each respondent, coefficient values on demographic covariates 
from GSS-based regressions for welfare spending support are used to predict baseline support for welfare spending. Values 
in the table are averages for cells based upon region of birth and region of current residence in 2000. Included covariates 
for prediction are indicator variables for income levels, age, education, gender, and marital status (the covariates from 
Column 2 of Table 3A). The coefficient values were originally centered around zero (the transformation of preferences to 
have mean zero and unit standard deviation in Table 3A), with the slight difference in this table (overall average of 0.004) 
coming due to the out-of-sample application to the 2000 Census. The table first shows that migrants from region of birth 
tend to be less supportive in terms of their demographic covariates for  redistribution (e.g., reflective of higher income 
groups being more likely to migrate). The table second shows that the migrants towards regions with the most substantial 
support based upon demographics (South and West) are not themselves of a demographic bias to accentuate the preference 
structure of the destination region. For example, migrants from the Midwest and Northeast to the West tend to have the 
lowest predicted support for redistribution based upon covariates. 
Region of Current Residence
Table A6: Geographic Mobility Bounding